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THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND SLAVERY IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
Tobias Barrington Wolff*
With increasing frequency, U.S. firms are carrying on their foreign oper-
ations through the exploitation of involuntary or slave labor.  As a result,
slavery has once again become an active component of some American indus-
tries.  The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution proclaims that slavery
shall not exist within the United States.  But does the Amendment prohibit
U.S. firms from exploiting foreign slave labor?  An answer to that question
will require a reexamination of the range of activities in American indus-
try—and American participation in global industry—that the Amendment
reaches.  This Article begins that task.  It analyzes the history of slavery and
the slave trade in America in order to identify the principles that lie at the
core of the Thirteenth Amendment.  It describes how the Court has translated
these core principles into a changing industrial context once before, in re-
sponse to the rise of domestic peonage arrangements in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.  It then offers a model for translating these same
core principles into the emerging context of the global economy and, in the
process, lays the foundation for a more modern and salient Thirteenth
Amendment jurisprudence.
INTRODUCTION
The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”1  Its lan-
guage is capacious and its mandate broad.  The prohibition embodied in
the Amendment, not limited to the form of chattel slavery peculiar to
pre-Civil War America, forbids almost all forms of compelled labor within
the physical bounds of the United States and its possessions.  But what of
slave labor outside U.S. territory?  When U.S. citizens participate in slave
practices in foreign jurisdictions, does the Thirteenth Amendment im-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of California Law School at Davis; J.D., Yale
Law School, 1997; B.A., Yale University, 1992.  I am especially grateful to Joel Paul, whose
encouragement is largely responsible for the existence of this article; to Stephen Best,
whose constant willingness to hear my thoughts in embryonic form is as indulgent as it is
invaluable; and to Robert Paul Wolff, who reviewed the many drafts that preceded this
finished product with a patience that one could only ask of a parent.  Sincere thanks also
go to Diane Amann, Kevin Bales, Alan Brownstein, Anupam Chander, Dick Fallon, Myriam
Gilles, Jack Goldsmith, Ryan Goodman, Jill Hasday, Kevin Johnson, Larry Kramer, Gerard
Magliocca, John Oakley, Charles Ogletree, Spencer Overton, Saskia Sassen, Madhavi
Sunder, Eric Stone, Leti Volpp, and Cynthia Griffin Wolff for their valued comments and
criticism, and to Dan Murphy, who provided superb research assistance.  Finally, Laurence
Borten provided outstanding editorial support.
1. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.
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pose any interdiction?  Can a U.S. citizen own a slave, so long as he does
not bring the enslaved person to American shores?
These questions are emerging as matters of great importance, for the
participation of U.S. citizens in foreign slave practices is on the rise.  With
increasing frequency, U.S.-based multinational corporations are carrying
on their operations in some countries through the deliberate exploita-
tion of involuntary or slave labor.  The globalization of industry has car-
ried with it a globalization of labor exploitation, occurring outside the
ordinary jurisdiction of U.S. enforcement authorities.  In countries such
as Burma, Mauritania, Pakistan, and Ivory Coast, outright practices of
slave labor have arisen, in varying forms and with varying levels of corpo-
rate involvement.2  American participation in such exploitation is often
carried out indirectly—through intermediaries, with plausible deniability.
And yet the abuse of foreign laborers under conditions of slavery is as-
suming an increasingly important position in the economics of some U.S.
industries—notable among them the resource extraction and manufac-
turing industries, where the use of cheap, expendable, involuntary labor
has markedly increased profitability.
This development in the foreign labor practices of U.S. entities her-
alds a new era of challenge and transformation for the Thirteenth
Amendment and its prohibition on the existence of slavery or involuntary
servitude.  It has become necessary to reexamine the range of activities in
American industry, and American participation in global industry, that
the Amendment reaches.  The inquiry is long overdue.  Despite the im-
portance of the principle that the Thirteenth Amendment embodies, its
doctrinal landscape is severely underdeveloped and has not yet been
meaningfully translated into the present industrial context.
The Amendment has faced such challenges before.  One of the first
came around the turn of the twentieth century, in response to the at-
tempts of post-Civil War landowners and industrialists to reinstate the
practical realities of slavery in a more legally palatable form through the
practice of peonage.  No longer able to exploit slave labor as a formal
institution, some employers pressed the law into service in the decades
following emancipation, enacting statutes that purported to aim at such
evils as debt default and fraud but had the effect of tying disempowered
workers to forced terms of labor under threat of prosecution and impris-
onment.  The Supreme Court rose to this challenge, elevating substance
over form and striking down these peonage schemes.3  In doing so, it
carried forward into a new industrial context the Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s dual promise to emancipate the slave laborer within American in-
dustry and to emancipate American industry from slave labor.
The present era of globalization has brought with it the next logical
step in this progression:  the pressing into involuntary service of foreign
2. See infra Part I.B.
3. See infra Part I.A.
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laborers by U.S.-based multinational entities.  Corporations based in the
United States can now export the slave dependent elements of their busi-
ness operations to foreign lands and then retrieve the fruits of those oper-
ations for domestic use and profit.  With that step, we are once again
seeing the reintroduction of slave labor into American industry.  It has
thus become necessary once again to translate the command of the Thir-
teenth Amendment for a new industrial context.
I choose the language of translation advisedly.4  As Professor Guyora
Binder has observed, anyone seeking to articulate a coherent approach to
modern interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment must address diffi-
cult questions of history.5  The enactment of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments undermined the precepts on which earlier approaches to constitu-
tional interpretation had rested, throwing into question the proper
interpretive approach to the Amendments themselves.  “It was the Recon-
struction Amendments’ command to abolish one of American culture’s
defining customs,” Professor Binder has observed, “that rendered them
peculiarly uninterpretable.”6
In the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, this interpretive dilemma
has already played out on the constitutional stage.  The road from Plessy
v. Ferguson7 to Brown v. Board of Education8 marked a journey between two
distinct visions of the relationship between tradition and constitutional
analysis.  In Plessy, the Court explicitly rested its rejection of the equal
protection challenge to legally enforced segregation upon “the estab-
4. As Professor Lessig has noted, the term “translation” has been used to describe the
interpretation of the Constitution under changing historical conditions.  Lawrence Lessig,
Understanding Changed Readings:  Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395, 400 & n.26
(1995); see also Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U. L. Rev. 204, 205 (1980) (using concept of translation to resist rigid applications of
original intent doctrine).
5. Guyora Binder, The Slavery of Emancipation, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 2063, 2063–64
(1996).
6. Id. at 2066.  Professor Binder discusses the interpretive problem in the following
terms:
For much of the nation’s history, elites shared a conception of legal reasoning as
a pragmatic process of adapting legal rules to evolving social custom. . . .
Adherents to this school disagreed about what were, to them, the important
issues:  the content of evolving custom, the institutions best suited to discern it,
and most importantly perhaps, the arena in which social custom evolved—the
bazaar, the forum, or the laboratory.  All agreed, however, that the evolving needs
and values of society were knowable and legally authoritative.
. . . .
. . . [Because] the institution of slavery was deeply and persistently en-
trenched in American society and culture, . . . the condemnation of slavery
challenged the legitimacy of the very traditions and customs on which
constitutional interpreters had always relied for guidance.
Id. at 2064–66.
7. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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lished usages, customs and traditions of the people.”9  Under that tradi-
tion, the Court explained, a separation of the races in public facilities
could be defended as “reasonable, and . . . enacted in good faith for the
promotion of the public good.”10  Custom and usage were a sufficient
response to a constitutional challenge under the dispensation to which
the Plessy majority subscribed.  One of the revolutionary changes wrought
by Brown was a deliberate rejection of this interpretive method.  “In ap-
proaching this problem [of segregation],” the Court wrote in Brown,
we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment
was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.
We must consider public education in the light of its full devel-
opment and its present place in American life throughout the
Nation.  Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in
public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection
of the laws.11
Thus, in concluding that legally enforced segregation in educational
facilities is “inherently unequal,”12 the Brown Court dramatically rejected
custom and tradition, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment embod-
ied substantive principles that do not automatically defer to established
social norms.13  A similar observation may be made about the Fifteenth
Amendment, which has occupied an interpretive landscape that has reca-
pitulated that of the Fourteenth in most relevant respects.14
In the case of the Thirteenth Amendment, the interpretive problem
has at once been more straightforward and more opaque.  There has
never been any question that the Amendment, in eradicating slavery and
elevating emancipation to the status of a constitutional imperative, em-
bodied a substantive rejection of one of America’s most pervasive customs
9. 163 U.S. at 550.
10. Id.
11. 347 U.S. at 492–93.
12. Id. at 495.
13. The Court added rhetorical reinforcement to this holding in Bolling v. Sharpe, the
federal companion case to Brown, where it pronounced that “Classifications based solely
upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions
and hence constitutionally suspect.”  347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (citing Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
From an historical point of view, of course, classifications based solely upon race were very
much a part of our traditions.  The Court must be understood here to refer, not to the
history of social norms in America, but to the constitutional tradition that, following Brown,
can now supplant contrary custom or usage.
14. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61–62 (1980) (holding that Fifteenth
Amendment only prohibits intentional discrimination), superseded by statute on other
grounds, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (same for
Fourteenth Amendment); Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 207 n.1 (1980) (“[T]he
nature of the enforcement powers conferred by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments has always been treated as coextensive.”).  But see Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S.
495, 522 (2000) (holding that Fifteenth Amendment requirement of race neutrality in
voting qualifications has additional force independent of Fourteenth Amendment “one
person, one vote” requirement).
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and traditions.15  In that respect, the Thirteenth Amendment directly im-
plemented a reshaping of the constitutional landscape that would only
take hold in the other Reconstruction Amendments after the passage of
ninety more years.  But in a broader sense, the Thirteenth Amendment
has yet to travel the road marked out by Plessy and Brown.  Consider Rob-
ertson v. Baldwin,16 one of the early post-Reconstruction Thirteenth
Amendment decisions, which the Court handed down in the Term fol-
lowing Plessy.  In Robertson, a merchant seaman challenged a federal stat-
ute that authorized the imprisonment and forcible return of sailors who
wished to leave the employ of their vessels.17  In rejecting this Thirteenth
Amendment claim, the majority embraced the same interpretive method
that it had recently deployed in its Fourteenth Amendment analysis in
Plessy.  Despite the radical rejection of tradition around the subject of
slavery and labor that was inherent in the Thirteenth Amendment itself,
the Robertson Court relied uncritically upon pre-Civil War common law
authorities to carve out a substantive exception to the scope of the
Amendment’s command, concluding that “the amendment was not in-
tended to introduce any novel doctrine with respect to certain descrip-
tions of service which have always been treated as exceptional.”18  Indeed,
Robertson includes a vigorous dissent by Justice Harlan, who staked out the
same interpretive ground that he had occupied in his Plessy dissent a year
earlier, rejecting the use to which the Robertson majority put custom and
tradition as inappropriate following the enactment of the Thirteenth
Amendment.19
15. See infra Part II.A.  Judge Waring, dissenting in one of the desegregation cases
that served as a precursor to Brown, noted that following the ratification of the
Constitution, “slavery was perpetuated and eventually became a part of the life and culture
of certain of the States of this Union although the rest of the world looked on with shame
and abhorrence.”  Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 541 (E.D.S.C. 1951) (Waring, J.,
dissenting).
16. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
17. Id. at 275–76.
18. Id. at 282.  The Court found that “military and naval enlistments” were among
these “exceptional” categories of service that fell outside the Amendment’s substantive
scope, along with “the right of parents and guardians to the custody of their minor
children or wards.”  Id.
19. Justice Harlan wrote:
It is said that the statute in question is sanctioned by long usage among the
nations of the earth, as well as by the above act of July 20, 1790.  In considering
the antiquity of regulations that restrain the personal freedom of seamen, the
court refers to the laws of the ancient Rhodians, which are supposed to have
antedated the Christian era.  But those laws, whatever they may have been, were
enacted at a time when no account was taken of man as man, when human life
and human liberty were regarded as of little value, and when the powers of
government were employed to gratify the ambition and the pleasures of despotic
rulers rather than promote the welfare of the people.
. . . .
Is the existing statute to be sustained because its essential provisions were
embodied in the act of 1790?  I think not, and for the reason, if there were no
other, that the Thirteenth Amendment imposes restrictions upon the powers of
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To articulate a Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence that is both
internally coherent and in step with the interpretive method now firmly
established for the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, one must
avoid a myopic hindsight that views the Amendment as accomplishing
nothing more than the constitutionalization of emancipation.  This is es-
pecially so in seeking out sources to identify the core values that the
Amendment embodies.  Binder poses the problem in the following terms:
“When the Constitution condemns society, where can we turn for aid in
construing it?  What aspects of American society authorize the Thirteenth
Amendment and what aspects are amended by it?  What was the essential
feature of the slavery that the Thirteenth Amendment commands us to
disestablish?”20  The Court made an initial gesture toward answering
these interpretive questions early in the twentieth century when it em-
ployed the Thirteenth Amendment to strike down the peonage and “an-
tifraud” statutes mentioned above.21  But since then, despite the interpre-
tive revolution in the other Reconstruction Amendments heralded by
Brown and its progeny, the Court has developed no approach to two basic
questions of interpretation:  “What was the essential feature of the slavery
that the Thirteenth Amendment commands us to disestablish”; and
“[W]here can we turn for aid in construing it?”22
This Article examines the most pressing contemporary application of
these questions:  the increasingly important role played by multinational
corporate entities in forced labor practices around the globe.  In doing
so, it offers an approach to addressing the broader implications of the
Thirteenth Amendment’s interpretive challenge.  My principal conten-
tion is that the Thirteenth Amendment forbids the deliberate incorpora-
tion of slave labor into American industry.  More precisely, I contend that
the knowing use of slave labor by U.S. based entities in their foreign oper-
ations constitutes the presence of “slavery” within the United States, as
that term is used in the Thirteenth Amendment, and hence that this
practice renders such U.S. entities subject to the prohibitory authority of
American courts through a private civil action.  The term “slavery” as it is
used in the Amendment entails more than the physical presence of en-
slaved individuals.  Slavery is a multilayered practice.  It creates a distinc-
tive form of interpersonal relationship.  It depends upon the existence of
Congress that did not exist when that act was passed.  The supreme law of the
land now declares that involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime of
which the party shall have been duly convicted, shall not exist anywhere within
the United States.
Id. at 293–97 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
20. Binder, supra note 5, at 2068. R
21. These issues are discussed at greater length in Part I.  For a valuable discussion of
the relationship between the interpretive approach to the Thirteenth Amendment and the
Lochner Court’s focus on freedom of contract as a limiting principle upon government
regulation, see Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil
Rights, 50 Duke L.J. 1609, 1630–34 (2001).
22. Binder, supra note 5, at 2068. R
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interrelated, supporting institutions for its sustainability.  And it arises not
by happenstance, but in response to the urging of industries that benefit
from its distinctive features and intentionally create a market for it.
Those who drafted the Thirteenth Amendment understood all three of
these aspects of slavery—the interpersonal, the institutional, and the in-
dustrial—to be vital elements of the practice that they sought to eradicate
with the Amendment’s enactment.  In this Article, I hope to begin the
process of translating that understanding into the language of the global
economy and, in the process, to lay the foundation for a more modern
and salient Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence.
Part I examines the Court’s translation of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to the changing industrial conditions of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries—the peonage cases—and provides an overview
of the exploitation of forced labor in the emerging context of today’s
global economy.  Part II employs an historical analysis of key elements of
the American institutions of slavery and peonage to identify the princi-
ples underlying the Amendment’s mandate that slavery “not exist” within
the United States.23  Part II.A examines interjurisdictional slavery dis-
putes—cases where slaves were carried to free jurisdictions—and recovers
the conclusion, reached by nineteenth-century jurists, that slavery creates
a robust social relation affecting the status of both master and slave.  Part
II.B traces the history of American efforts to prohibit illegal participation
in the foreign slave trade and examines the Supreme Court’s application
of those prohibitions to certain supporting institutions—shipwrights and
provisioners—that permitted illegal slave trading to flourish.  Part II.C
turns to the relationship between slavery and industrial forces, surveying
the recognition by both jurists and scholars that slavery often arises be-
cause certain industries have intentionally created markets for forced la-
bor.  Part II ends by examining the proposed application of these princi-
ples to the foreign slave practices of contemporary American
corporations.  Part III then considers this foreign slavery doctrine in light
of prior treatments of the extraterritorial application of American law.
I. TRANSLATION AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION
The project of translation that I propose is not a new one for the
Thirteenth Amendment.  Despite its early embrace of a conservative in-
terpretive approach in Robertson, the Supreme Court has since recognized
the continuing need to apply the Amendment in new ways to the chang-
ing shape of American industry.  In the peonage cases, the Court rejected
a constrained, overly formalistic interpretation and took a step toward
defining the principles lying at the Amendment’s core.  This Part begins
23. I take my project to be consonant with Professor Gerald Neuman’s observation
that, “To understand the course that American constitutionalism has taken since 1789, it is
necessary to consider not only the rules that have been adopted at various historical
periods, but also the normative visions underlying those rules and the choices faced by the
decisionmakers.”  Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 Yale L.J. 909, 913 (1991).
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with an examination of that early process of translation.  It then goes on
to describe the emerging problem of global labor exploitation and the
need for a Thirteenth Amendment response.
A. Early Translations:  The Thirteenth Amendment and Domestic Industry
The Thirteenth Amendment contains no state action requirement.24
It thus occupies a unique position in our Constitution.  The rest of the
Constitution sets forth a mandate for the operation of government and
invests individuals with rights against the State.25  The Thirteenth
Amendment is broader in scope.  In addition to the restrictions that it
places upon government, the Amendment imposes substantive limita-
tions on the nature of allowable private social and economic relation-
ships.26  These limitations were born of a particular context—the distinc-
tively American system of chattel slavery—but extend beyond those
origins to forbid “any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter.”27  As the
Court recently explained, the Amendment’s prohibition against “involun-
tary servitude” encompasses all those “situations in which the victim is
compelled to work by law” or is subjected to “compulsion through physi-
cal coercion.”28  And this broad prohibition is self-executing.29  While the
Thirteenth Amendment has benefited from the assistance of implement-
ing legislation, primarily in the form of criminal sanctions,30 such legisla-
24. See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988) (“[T]he Thirteenth
Amendment extends beyond state action . . . .”).
25. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
195–96 (1989) (holding Due Process Clause only invests individuals with negative rights
against State and creates no affirmative constitutional duty).
26. Professor Binder has rendered this observation powerfully, writing:  “The
Thirteenth Amendment’s countercustomary thrust is clear.  Slavery was a historically
present institution of society that had emerged as custom before it was recognized as law.
To constitutionally abolish slavery was to disestablish and repudiate existing and enduring
custom.”  Binder, supra note 5, at 2066. R
27. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872).  As the Court famously went on
to explain, “If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of
the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to
make it void.”  Id.
28. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942.
29. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (“By its own unaided force
and effect [the Thirteenth Amendment] abolished slavery, and established universal
freedom.”).
30. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1582 (1994) (criminalizing participation of U.S. citizens in
foreign slave trade); id. § 1584 (criminalizing involuntary servitude); id. § 1585
(criminalizing sale of slaves in foreign slave trade).
I do not explore the question of what precise form remedies for private violations of
the Thirteenth Amendment ought to take.  It is clear that the Amendment is enforceable
against private actors, and hence that some remedy is available even in the absence of a
statutorily created cause of action.  See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20 (stating that
Thirteenth Amendment is “self-executing without any ancillary legislation, so far as its
terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances”); Terry Props., Inc. v. Standard
Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523, 1534 (11th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that Thirteenth Amendment
may impose liability directly against private actors).  Only a handful of cases have
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tion has never been necessary to carry into effect the fundamental
changes in social and economic relations that the Amendment itself
brought about.31
The first such change, of course, was the eradication of the formal
institution of chattel slavery in America.  Following the enactment of the
Amendment, human beings could no longer be bought and sold as prop-
erty.  But human ingenuity is perhaps most potent when aimed at self-
enrichment, and in the wake of the Civil War, Southern industrial inter-
ests strove to devise employment schemes that would reproduce the real-
ity of slave labor even in the absence of the formal institution.  Thus arose
the system of peonage.
Peonage was a system of forced labor that depended upon the in-
debtedness of a worker, rather than an actual property right in a slave, as
the means of compelling work.  A prospective employer would offer a
laborer a “loan” or “advance” on his wages, typically as a condition of
employment, and then use the newly created debt to compel the worker
to remain on the job for as long as the employer wished.  As the system of
slavery looked to the law to enforce the property rights of the owner, so
peonage pressed the law into service to enforce the property rights of the
creditor, compelling service from the worker in payment of the debt.
The juridical category was different—the property right in a human be-
ing, now forbidden, was replaced with the generally accepted right of a
creditor to enforce a debt—but the result was largely the same:  The coer-
considered the question, and they have differed as to whether a cause of action for
monetary damages should be available in the absence of implementing legislation.
Compare Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1997) (assuming availability of
damages remedy directly under Thirteenth Amendment), with Turner v. Unification
Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 374 (D.R.I. 1978), aff’d mem., 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979)
(finding that court has power to award damages remedy but declining to do so in absence
of implementing legislation).  See also Samantha C. Halem, Slaves to Fashion:  A
Thirteenth Amendment Litigation Strategy to Abolish Sweatshops in the Garment
Industry, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 397, 416–21 (1999) (using case of Thai garment workers
subjected to forced labor in El Monte, California to explore remedies available under
Thirteenth Amendment).  A remedy for injunctive relief in the case of an ongoing
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment is clearly available—and, in the case of foreign
slavery abuses, perhaps more appropriate.  Cf. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479
U.S. 104, 110–11 (1986) (explaining that standing requirements under antitrust laws are
less stringent when private party seeks only injunctive relief).
31. Slavery receives similar treatment in international law.  Slavery and forced labor
are among the few human rights violations that rise to the level of a “peremptory norm”—
that is, constitute a remediable violation of international law without regard to the
involvement of the state.  See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891–92 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) (holding that slavery is one of a “‘handful of crimes’” actionable against
individuals under international law principles and need not be the result of state action);
International Labour Office, Stopping Forced Labour 12–13 (2001), available at http://
www.ilo.org/declaration [hereinafter Stopping Forced Labour] (“With coercion at the
heart of forced labour, the principle of eliminating it applies irrespective of whether the
perpetrators are acting officially, as agents of the State, or unofficially as private
individuals.”).
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cive power of the State was used to compel labor from poor (and usually
black) workers, on threat of imprisonment.
Legally sanctioned peonage arrangements blossomed in the South
following the Civil War and continued into the twentieth century.  Ac-
cording to Professor Jacqueline Jones, “perhaps as many as one-third of
all [sharecropping farmers] in Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia were
being held against their will in 1900.”32  Not surprisingly, employers used
peonage arrangements primarily in industries that involved hazardous
working conditions and very low pay.33  While black workers were not the
exclusive victims of peonage arrangements in America, they suffered
under its yoke in vastly disproportionate numbers.34  Along with Jim
Crow laws that segregated transportation and public facilities, these laws
helped to restrict the movement of freed black workers and thereby keep
them in a state of poverty and vulnerability.35
As a formal matter, peonage rested on seemingly unobjectionable
legal foundations.  It was frequently a “voluntary” arrangement; that is,
workers with little or no alternative would “voluntarily” assume the obliga-
tion that rendered them subject to the threat of debtor’s prison.  More
importantly, peonage eschewed those features of slavery around which
some of the most pointed criticism had centered in nineteenth century
legal discourse.  It did not recognize a property right in a human being (a
peon could not be sold in the manner of a slave);36 and the condition of
peonage did not work “corruption of blood” and travel to the children of
the worker.37  Peonage, in short, was not chattel slavery.  Yet the practice
32. Jacqueline Jones, The Dispossessed 107 (1992).
33. See, e.g., id. at 128–29 (describing peonage in phosphate industry in turn of the
century Florida, which entailed difficult and dangerous seasonal work); id. at 152–53
(same for turpentine extraction).
34. See id. at 154 (“The peonage files of the U.S. Justice Department bulge with the
records of cases reported to the attorney general, beginning in 1901, and reveal the
pervasive use of non-free black labor in the South’s rural industries.”).
35. Id. at 107.
36. A peon’s debt could be assigned or “sold,” however.  See, e.g., Goluboff, supra
note 21, at 1661 (describing sale and assignment of peonage debts as fairly common R
practice in turn of the century South).  While such a transfer would not entail the type of
radical dislocation that was notorious in the sale of chattel slaves, it further embodied the
commodification of the individual that was inherent in peonage arrangements:  “[T]he
sale of debt arguably may have enhanced worker mobility . . . . The fact that debts were
sold, that people could remain in debt for long periods of time, and that movement
between jobs and employers was difficult, albeit perhaps not impossible, were considered
indications of a failure of free labor.”  Id.
37. See, for example, the description provided by a federal district court in Alabama
at the turn of the century, in an opinion striking down local peonage provisions as violative
of the Thirteenth Amendment:
The peon was not a slave.  He was a freeman, with political as well as civil rights.
He entered into the relation from choice, for a definite period, as the result of
mutual contract.  The relation was not confined to any race.  The child of a peon
did not become a peon, and the father could not contract away the services of his
minor child, except in rare cases.  The peon, male or female, agreed with the
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unquestionably reproduced many of the immediate practical realities of
slavery—a vast underclass of laborers, held to their jobs by force of law
and threat of imprisonment, with few if any opportunities for escape.38
The Reconstruction Congress, not insensible to this reintroduction
of slave labor to American industry, outlawed peonage and passed crimi-
nal statutes under the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment to enforce
that proscription.39  Enforcement of the statutes was sporadic at first but
became more vigorous by the turn of the century.40  When prosecutions
began to reach the Supreme Court, they presented the Court with a chal-
lenge.  Would the Court adopt a strictly formal approach to the Thir-
teenth Amendment and its enforcing legislation and refuse to extend its
ambit to those “voluntary” peonage arrangements to which laborers sub-
jected themselves?  Or would it give the Amendment an expansive inter-
pretation that would reach all instances of involuntary labor, whatever
form they took?  Given the narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and its enforcement power adopted by the Court twenty
years earlier in the Civil Rights Cases,41 an expansive interpretation was
not a foregone conclusion.  But in Clyatt v. United States,42 the Court deci-
sively chose that course.  Rejecting arguments that would privilege form
over substance, the Court reiterated in Clyatt that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment eradicated slavery and involuntary servitude of every manifestation:
Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or involuntary, but
this implies simply a difference in the mode of origin, but none
in the character of the servitude.  The one exists where the
debtor voluntarily contracts to enter the service of his creditor.
The other is forced upon the debtor by some provision of law.
But peonage, however created, is compulsory service, involun-
tary servitude.43
master upon the nature of the service, the length of its duration, and
compensation.  The peon then became bound to the master “for an indebtedness
founded upon an advancement in consideration of service.”
Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 673–74 (M.D. Ala. 1903).  Note, however, that the master in a
peonage relationship could sell the debt of the peon (and with it the obligation to work),
with or without the consent of the worker.  Id.
38. For a useful discussion of the rise of peonage and other similar arrangements
during and after Reconstruction, see Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the
Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 437, 485–95 (1989).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1994) (abolishing peonage and nullifying any act or law
that establishes or maintains such a system); see also, e.g., Peonage Act of 1867, 14 Stat.
546, ch. 187, § 1 (1867), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000) (prohibiting peonage in
Reconstruction era).
40. Jones, supra note 32, at 153–54; Goluboff, supra note 21, at 1637–47.  For an R
important and detailed examination of subsequent federal enforcement efforts during the
first half of the twentieth century, see id. at 1637–68.
41. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
42. 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
43. Id. at 215.
\\Server03\productn\C\COL\102-4\COL403.txt unknown Seq: 12  7-MAY-02 17:50
984 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:973
Not to be deterred, some Southern states responded to Clyatt by re-
packaging their peonage schemes as “antifraud” proscriptions.44  These
provisions operated to enforce the same system of forced indebtedness
through salary advances that had existed under traditional peonage ar-
rangements.  But here, the mode of enforcement was an evidentiary pre-
sumption.  The presumption provided that any employee who accepted
an advance on his salary and then chose to leave before his term of labor
was up must have intended to “defraud” his employer.  Under this modi-
fied peonage system, prosecutions for fraud replaced prosecutions for
debtor default as the means of enforcing the forced labor arrangement.
When these statutes were challenged under the Thirteenth Amendment,
the Court once again declined to elevate form over substance, holding in
Bailey v. Alabama that “[w]hat the state may not do directly it may not do
indirectly” through an evidentiary presumption.45  In a series of cases be-
ginning with Bailey, the Court struck down these “fraud” statutes as yet
another device for reintroducing involuntary servitude into American
industry.46
Given the much noted statement of the Court forty years earlier in
the Slaughter-House Cases that the Thirteenth Amendment was not limited
in its application to chattel slavery but would prohibit a Mexican peonage
or Chinese coolie system from evolving into a system of involuntary servi-
tude,47 it could be argued that the results in Clyatt and Bailey were
prefigured.  Nonetheless, their significance in the doctrinal evolution of
the Thirteenth Amendment should not be missed.  In finding that the
Thirteenth Amendment and its implementing legislation operated to
prohibit peonage—however named and through whatever device accom-
plished—the Court translated the mandate of the Thirteenth Amend-
44. See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 7–13 (1944) (describing history of peonage
statutes, revisions, and court challenges in Southern states).
45. 219 U.S. 219, 244 (1911).
46. See id. (“If [the State] cannot punish the servant as a criminal for the mere failure
or refusal to serve without paying his debt, it is not permitted to accomplish the same result
by creating a statutory presumption which upon proof of no other fact exposes him to
conviction and punishment.”); id. at 242 (“Congress was not concerned [in antipeonage
statute] with mere names or manner of description, or with a particular place or section of
the country.  It was concerned with a fact, wherever it might exist; with a condition,
however named and wherever it might be established, maintained or enforced.”); infra
note 206 (describing peonage cases). R
As one might expect, however, the Supreme Court’s rulings did not immediately
eradicate the practice of peonage:
Despite the formal end to debt peonage in 1911 (as a result of the Supreme
Court’s Alonzo Bailey decision), black and white croppers throughout the South
continued to believe that they risked bodily harm to themselves if they left a place
over the objections of its owner; and they were right.
Jones, supra note 32, at 114. R
47. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872); see also Akhil Reed Amar &
Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery:  A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney,
105 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1368 (1992) (discussing expansive implications of the Slaughter-
House Cases).
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ment into a new context for American industry.48  It adopted an expan-
sive mode of practical reasoning and found the Amendment applicable
to whatever manifestations of slavery or involuntary servitude should en-
joy a presence within the reach of U.S. jurisdiction.49  And it definitively
rejected the assertion that workers could bear complicity for their own
enslavement by “voluntarily” entering into arrangements of power and
dominance.50
B. Foreign Labor Practices and the Globalization of American Industry
The Court’s disapproval of domestic peonage laws did not defini-
tively eradicate all domestic forced labor.  Such exploitation does still oc-
cur within the United States, as recent investigations of the garment in-
dustry and the use of imported domestic servants have demonstrated.51
48. Cf. Goluboff, supra note 21, at 1647–48 (“During World War II and the years that R
followed, the [Justice Department] Civil Rights Section’s uses of the Thirteenth
Amendment reflected a broadening of the Amendment’s meaning from a Lochner-era
emphasis on debt to include servitude that resulted from other types of legal, economic,
and social coercion.”).
49. See Bailey, 219 U.S. at 242 (stating that, in passing antipeonage legislation,
Congress “was concerned with a fact, wherever it might exist; with a condition, however
named and wherever it might be established, maintained or enforced”).
50. Professor Goluboff argues that Clyatt and the other early peonage cases did not go
as far as they might have in embracing a broad principle of free labor under the
Thirteenth Amendment.  Goluboff, supra note 21, at 1637–39.  “Although the Court still R
expressed free labor aspirations” in the early peonage cases, she explains, “it defined
peonage narrowly and reinforced the notion that the Thirteenth Amendment was a rule
that abolished a small and diminishing category of unfree servitudes without touching
either the core racial or class inequalities of American society.”  Id. at 1639.  Goluboff
convincingly asserts that the full promise of the peonage cases was only realized in Pollock
v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944), the Court’s last word on the issue, where it finally employed
language suggesting the possibility of broader, liberatory implications for American labor.
Goluboff, supra note 21, at 1674–75.  The Pollock Court wrote: R
When the master can compel and the laborer cannot escape the obligation to go
on, there is no power below to redress and no incentive above to relieve a harsh
overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.  Resulting depression of
working conditions and living standards affects not only the laborer under the
system, but every other with whom his labor comes in competition.
322 U.S. at 18.
Professor Goluboff’s insights here (as throughout her article) are valuable, and I take
them to be fully consistent with my own account of the evolution of the peonage doctrine.
For Goluboff’s purposes, the narrowing of focus in the early peonage cases to a particular
mode of labor exploitation represents a doctrinal step backward.  For my purposes, the
Court’s vigorous enforcement of free labor principles within that narrow focus, and
particularly its refusal to permit actual instances of forced labor to cloak themselves
effectively in unobjectionable legal categories, represents an important doctrinal
innovation.  And more to the point, Goluboff and I find in Pollock the same flowering of
certain principles of liberation embedded in the Thirteenth Amendment, as my
subsequent discussion of the case will make clear.  See infra text accompanying notes
202–219. R
51. See, e.g., Goluboff, supra note 21, at 1662–68 (describing exploitation of domestic R
servants through peonage arrangements in early twentieth century); Halem, supra note 30, R
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But such situations are exceptional; in its most basic application, the Thir-
teenth Amendment has been a success.  The most pervasive problems of
slavery and involuntary servitude in America now involve the exploitation
by U.S. corporations of workers in foreign countries.  In some places,
these forced labor practices reflect cultural struggles—often exacerbated
by colonialism—that have existed since long before western investors
looked abroad for cheap labor; in others, forced labor has arisen as a
direct response to the demands of multinational corporations.  What fol-
lows is a description of several instances of forced labor in foreign juris-
dictions, exhibiting varying degrees of American corporate
involvement.52
1. The Resource Extraction Industry in Burma. — The exploitation of
forced labor in Burma53 is perhaps the most egregious and heavily docu-
mented instance of labor abuse in the international community today.
Following a 1962 coup d’état, Burma came under the rule of a military
government.  That regime has committed brutal human rights violations
against its people in suppressing democratic activities and repressing eth-
nic minorities.  The violations have included summary execution, rape
and sexual abuse, and regular denial of civil liberties.  They have been so
extreme that Burma has been targeted for singular censure by the inter-
national community.54  This censure has included the unprecedented es-
at 400–09 (same for U.S. garment industry); A. Yasmine Rassam, Contemporary Forms of
Slavery and the Evolution of the Prohibition of Slavery and the Slave Trade Under
Customary International Law, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 303, 328 n.110 (1999) (discussing abuse of
imported domestic workers as housebound slaves).
52. My principal focus in this overview concerns the exploitation of foreign slave labor
by domestic industries that produce otherwise legal products, such as energy resources or
manufactured goods.  I do not address the widespread practice of sexual slavery, in which
human beings (usually women or minors) are brutally compelled to submit to prostitution
and rape for the enrichment of others.  This omission is solely a consequence of the fact
that my thesis has limited practical application to forced labor in industries that are
themselves illegal in the United States.  But as international organizations and scholars
alike have recognized, the practice of sexual slavery is both severe and pervasive, deserving
close attention.  See, e.g., Kevin Bales, Disposable People 34–79 (1999) (detailing system of
sexual slavery in Thailand); Stopping Forced Labour, supra note 31, at 47–58 (reporting R
on trafficking of women and minors for use as sexual slaves); Etsuro Totsuka, Commentary
on a Victory for “Comfort Women”:  Japan’s Judicial Recognition of Military Sexual
Slavery, 8 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 47, 47–48 (1999) (discussing sexual slavery practices
undertaken by Japanese military); Vanessa B.M. Vergara, Comment, Abusive Mail-Order
Bride Marriage and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1547, 1547–68 (2000)
(discussing abuse of women imported as brides from Asian and eastern-bloc countries).
53. The country of Burma is also known as Myanmar.  The U.S. government
continues to use the name “Burma” in its foreign diplomacy.  Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 2d 1294, 1296 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
54. Myriad international organizations have identified the Burmese regime as one of
the worst human rights offenders in the world today.  Indeed, the International Labour
Office (a division of the United Nations) credits the sheer magnitude of labor abuses in
Burma with the recent elevated international attention to such practices throughout the
world:  “Worldwide attention to forced labour has increased in recent years through the
international appeals to one country in particular (Myanmar) to rectify that persistent
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tablishment of a Commission of Inquiry by the U.N.’s International La-
bour Office (ILO), which has made broad recommendations for
improving conditions in Burma.55
Forced labor practices have been a prominent component of the
Burmese military’s abuses.56  In recent years, many of those practices
have centered around the construction of two natural gas pipelines, the
Yadana and the Yetagun, designed to transport natural gas from epony-
mous deposits off the coast of Burma for sale in neighboring Thailand.57
The pipelines were constructed and are being operated by a joint ven-
ture, the principal participants of which are two western energy compa-
nies:  Unocal, a California corporation, and Total, a French entity.  Uno-
cal and Total have employed the assistance of the Burmese military since
they began work on the project in the early 1990s.58  Throughout the life
of the project, the military has followed a consistent practice of enslaving
its own people to support the profitable extraction and transportation of
natural gas in partnership with Unocal and Total.59
Forced labor in the Yadana and Yetagun projects has taken several
distinct forms, which may roughly be divided into three categories.  In
each case, local villagers, most of them members of the Karen ethnic mi-
problem.”  Stopping Forced Labour, supra note 31, Executive Summary, at vii.  See also R
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar:  Report of the Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N.
ESCOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 132–33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/167 (2000)
(deploring human rights violations in Myanmar).
Some states and municipalities in the U.S. have also attempted to respond to the
abuses in Burma through the enactment of local policies against contracting with
companies that do work in the country.  One such law was the subject of the recent
Supreme Court decision placing limits on the ability of nonfederal entities to adopt
policies that may impact foreign relations.  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363, 373–74 (2000) (striking down Massachusetts law that restricted ability of state entities
to contract with companies doing business in Burma).
55. International Labour Office, Measures Recommended by the Governing Body
Under Article 33 of the Constitution—Implementation of Recommendations Contained in
the Report of the Commission of Inquiry Entitled Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma),
International Labour Conference, 88th Sess., Geneva, Provisional Record No. 4, at 4/2
(2000); Stopping Forced Labour, supra note 31, at 44–46. R
56. See Bales, supra note 52, at 247 (“The current military dictatorship in Burma, R
which enslaves its own citizens, has faced censure in the media and in the United Nations
and the European Union after reports from [NGOs].”).
57. A thorough account of human rights abuses in Burma connected with the Yadana
and Yetagun projects may be found in a report issued by EarthRights International, a
nongovernmental human rights organization.  EarthRights Int’l, Total Denial Continues,
passim (2000) [hereinafter Total Denial Continues].  The Yadana and Yetagun projects
have also given rise to a number of lawsuits in state and federal court in California, seeking
damages against the corporations for their role in perpetuating human rights abuses
against the plaintiff indigenes.  Those cases include accounts of the factual allegations
against the companies.  See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883–85 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
58. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
59. Total Denial Continues, supra note 57, at 25–96.  The district court in Unocal R
recounts allegations to the same effect. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
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nority, have been forcibly conscripted into service under threat of vio-
lence.  First, villagers have been forced to clear the great swaths of land
over which the pipelines were laid, often having to cut and clear kilome-
ters-wide corridors through jungle growth.60  Second, local populations
have been forced to construct support structures for the project on an
ongoing basis—for example, landing pads for the helicopters that pro-
vide transport for foreigners traveling in the region, or barracks for the
military personnel guarding the project.61  And third, locals are regularly
forced to serve as porters for the military personnel working on the pro-
ject, often carrying crippling loads without rest.62  These forms of forced
labor have been vital to the construction and operation of the pipelines.
The extent to which Unocal and Total have participated in these
forced labor practices remains contested.63  There is no question that the
companies have worked closely with the military regime throughout the
project—coordinating the clear cutting and the construction of support
facilities, for example, and using soldiers to provide on-site security.64
There is substantial evidence demonstrating that the companies knew
from an early stage that the military was enslaving the local populations to
work on the pipelines and chose to continue with the project nonethe-
less.65  Company executives apparently acknowledge that the relationship
between the companies and the military has been an agency or employ-
ment relationship, as in the following account by U.S. Embassy personnel
of statements made by a senior Unocal executive, Joel Robinson:  “On the
general issue of the close working relationship between Total/Unocal
and the Burmese military, Robinson had no apologies. He stated forth-
rightly that the companies have hired the Burmese to provide security for
the project and pay for this through [a subsidiary of the joint venture].”66
Unocal and Total deny any complicity in slave labor practices in Burma,
though there are reports of continuing abuses on the project.67
Other U.S. corporations have also participated in the Yadana and
Yetagun pipelines, although their connection to the exploitation of slaves
on the project appears to be more tenuous.  Most notable among these is
60. Total Denial Continues, supra note 57, at 87–96. R
61. Id. at 25–30, 82–87.
62. Id. at 53–61.
63. In part, outside organizations have been hampered in their ability to develop
evidence concerning human rights violations in Burma because of the inaccessibility of the
country to outsiders under the current military regime.  See Bales, supra note 52, at R
265–66.
64. See Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1297–99.
65. Total Denial Continues, supra note 57, at 62–99. R
66. Id. at 62 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of State Unclassified Cable from U.S. Embassy in
Rangoon, Cable No. 002067, at ¶ 28 (1995)).
67. Seth Mydans, Accusations of Forced Labor, N.Y. Times, June 13, 2001, at A10
(noting reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International of continuing abuses
in Burma); Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001:  Burma Still Using Forced Labor
(June 12, 2001), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/06/burma0612.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
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Halliburton Co., a major energy corporation formerly headed by now-
Vice President Richard Cheney.  In the mid 1990s, Halliburton helped lay
the offshore portion of the pipeline that extends to the Yadana gas
fields.68  The company has declined to state whether it was aware of the
ongoing forced labor practices when it aided in constructing the pipe-
line.69  Responding to inquiries on the subject in 1997, Cheney replied,
“The problem is that the good Lord didn’t see fit to always put oil and gas
resources where there are democratic governments.”70 Abuses in the re-
source extraction industry have been documented in other regions of the
world as well.  In Brazil, for example, the domestic steel industry depends
upon forced labor to obtain inexpensive charcoal for use in its produc-
tion process.71
2. Manufacturing Industries. — American companies regularly export
portions of their manufacturing and assembly work to foreign markets in
order to take advantage of their inexpensive and unregulated labor
forces.  This is particularly true in the garment industry, in which the
assembly and manufacturing work for many high profile American labels
is performed abroad.  In increasing numbers, reports of forced labor are
coming to light in such foreign manufacturing facilities.  As Professor Ke-
vin Bales explains, “international business now seeks to buy labor at the
lowest cost, often through subcontractors, [and] some of these contrac-
tors achieve the lowest cost by using slave labor.”72
In some countries, forced labor practices in manufacturing benefit
from the practice of “bonded labor,” a traditional form of peonage or
indentured servitude in which a laborer is compelled to work in order to
pay off a debt.  In such countries, the tradition of bonded labor may lure
foreign manufacturers with the promise of a cheap, disposable workforce.
One much noted example may be found in Pakistan, where bonded labor
arrangements have traditionally been used to compel work from chil-
dren.  Though now officially illegal, these arrangements have a long and
68. EarthRights Int’l, Halliburton’s Destructive Engagement 4–5 (2000).
69. E.g., Peter Waldman, A Pipeline Project in Myanmar Puts Cheney in Spotlight,
Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 2000, at A1 (“At Halliburton, a spokeswoman says the company used no
forced labor on the pipeline.  But she refuses to comment on the company’s decision to
work in Myanmar or whether Halliburton was aware of human-rights or security concerns
in Myanmar during Mr. Cheney’s tenure.”); cf. Stopping Forced Labour, supra note 31, at R
45 (describing forced labor abuses in Myanmar and explaining that “Sometimes, this
forced labour had been imposed for the profit of private individuals”).
70. Waldman, supra note 69; see also Agis Salpukas, Foreign Energy, Domestic R
Politics:  Burmese Project Tests Unocal Resolve, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1997, at D1
(describing Unocal’s dependence upon foreign investment and public and political
pressure regarding its projects in Burma).
71. See Bales, supra note 52, at 23 (describing use of slave labor in Brazilian steel R
industry); Stopping Forced Labour, supra note 31, at 25 (describing variety of forced labor R
practices in Brazil).
72. Bales, supra note 52, at 236. R
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robust history.73  Nike, Gap, and other American corporations have con-
tracted assembly work to Pakistani manufacturers that employ such invol-
untary child workers, allegedly with the knowledge that slave labor would
be used to assemble their products more cheaply.74
Forced labor also occurs in sweatshops specially constructed to serve
American corporations.  In the late 1990s, allegations that such clothing
producers as Nike and Gap used forced labor in Asian sweatshops to man-
ufacture their clothes received considerable attention in the media.75
More recently, garment workers in Saipan, an island in the Common-
wealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,76 have filed a series of lawsuits in
federal district court in California charging that conditions of peonage,
indentured servitude, and forced labor have predominated in the sweat-
shops where they work.77  The original suit named twenty-six major Amer-
ican clothing manufacturers as defendants, all of whom allegedly con-
spired to exploit the involuntary labor of foreign workers imported to
work in the Saipan facilities.78  As of mid-2001, nineteen of the defend-
73. See id. at 149–94 (describing problem of bonded labor in Pakistan); Stopping
Forced Labour, supra note 31, at 40–42 (same). R
74. CorpWatch, “Action Alert,” Blood, Sweat & Shears, at  http://www.corpwatch.
org/trac/feature/sweatshops/countries/pakistan.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2002) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (describing use of forced child labor in production of soccer
balls for Nike and other corporations and concluding that “up to 20% of the balls brought
to the U.S. continue to be stitched by children under the age of 14”); see also Bales, supra
note 52, at 236–37 (describing use of bonded and slave labor by Nike, Gap, and other R
companies in Pakistan, India, Thailand, and Brazil).
75. See Bales, supra note 52, at 236; Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, Corporate R
Predators:  The Hunt for Mega-Profits and the Attack on Democracy 164–66 (1999).
76. The Northern Mariana Islands are a protectorate of the United States, so there is
no question that the Thirteenth Amendment and its implementing statutes apply to the
workers’ claims.  See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878) (applying Sixth
Amendment rights to criminal prosecution in Territory of Utah); Neuman, supra note 23, R
at 955–57 (discussing Reynolds and applicability of Constitution to U.S. territories).  Given
their geographical, cultural, and economic distance from the political community of the
United States, however, the exploitation of forced labor on the Islands speaks to the
greater potential for labor exploitation in Asia and the South Pacific.
77. William Carlsen, Sweatshop Conditions Alleged on U.S. Island:  Retailers Sued for
Selling “Made in U.S.A.” Garments, S.F. Chron., Jan. 14, 1999, at A1; Steven Greenhouse,
Suit Says 18 Companies Conspired to Violate Sweatshop Workers’ Civil Rights, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 14, 1999, at A9.
From the time the lawsuit was filed until June 2000, the author was a litigator at a law
firm representing some of the original defendants.  The author was never involved in any
of the cases.  The brief summary that follows relies entirely upon publicly available
information.
78. Sweatshop Watch, Summary of the Saipan Sweatshop Litigation (Oct. 10, 2000), at
http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/marianas/summary10_00.html (listing
manufacturers named in suit) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Douglas S.
Morrin, People Before Profits:  Pursuing Corporate Accountability for Labor Rights
Violations Abroad Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 20 B.C. Third World L.J. 427,
441–45 (2000) (reviewing Mokhiber & Weissman, supra note 75) (describing allegations in R
Saipan cases); Kevin Tessier, Project, The New Slave Trade:  The International Crisis of
Immigrant Smuggling, 3 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 261, 261–64 (1995) (describing
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ants had settled, but the lawsuit continued against such manufacturers as
Levi Strauss & Co., Gap, and Abercrombie and Fitch.79  Recent news re-
ports suggest that similar conditions of involuntary servitude may exist in
garment sweatshops in Samoa, another American protectorate in the
South Pacific.80
3. Agricultural Industries. — Some of the most extensive exploitation
of slave labor occurs in agricultural industries.  Poor workers around the
world are regularly compelled to work in food production.  In many
cases, such forced labor takes the form of debt bondage.  The ILO re-
ports that debt bondage in agriculture remains a problem in many coun-
tries of South and Central America, including Guatemala, Mexico, Peru,
Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Brazil,81 and also in India, Pakistan,
and Nepal.82  The report explains:
Serious problems exist in remote areas; for example, tropi-
cal forests have been opened up for agricultural, mineral or for-
estry development.  The persons susceptible to abuse may be in-
digenous and tribal peoples. . . . Thus the problems of coercion
are often connected with seasonal labour migration, both within
and across national frontiers.  The migration may be to jobs in
agriculture, forestry, processing of food products or materials,
or domestic work but all risk ending up in debt bondage.83
Forced agricultural labor may even result in systems of outright chat-
tel slavery, though such cases are rare.  In Mauritania, a country in north-
west Africa, a de facto state of slavery still holds much of the African eth-
nic minority in its grip, despite the official abolition of slavery as an
institution in 1980.84  Slaves continue to support every sector of the
smuggling of immigrants from Asian countries, particularly China, to become exploited
workers in U.S.); Carlsen, supra note 77 (describing allegations of “slavery-like conditions” R
including “guarded barb-wire compounds”).
79. Sweatshop Watch, supra note 78; Sweatshop Watch, Saipan Sweatshop Litigation: R
An Update (Apr. 13, 2001), at http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/marianas/saipanupdate_
may01.html (listing defendants who had settled to date) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
80. E.g., Janet Moore, From Sweatshop to Here:  Two Vietnamese Women Have
Landed at a Minneapolis Hotel After Fleeing a Garment Factory on American Samoa, Star
Trib. (Minneapolis), June 1, 2001, at D1 (reporting that owner of Samoan factory
manufacturing clothes for J.C. Penney, Kohl’s, and Target has been charged by FBI with
subjecting workers to conditions of forced labor).
81. Stopping Forced Labour, supra note 31, at 21–28. R
82. Id. at 32–43; Bales, supra note 52, at 8–10. R
83. Stopping Forced Labour, supra note 31, at 21.  One much noted situation persists R
in the Dominican Republic, where thousands of Haitian laborers regularly migrate to work
in the sugarcane fields and are subjected to conditions that many argue amount to forced
labor or slavery.  Id. at 24–25; Bales, supra note 52, at 236.  See generally Michelle E. R
Gorden, Comment, Haitian Forced Labor in the Dominican Republic, 15 Comp. Lab. L.J.
206, 212–23 (1994) (discussing Haitian labor problems in the Dominican Republic).
84. Bales, supra note 52, at 80–81. R
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Mauritanian economy, including the agricultural, and are still bought
and sold as property.85
While this exploitation of forced labor in agriculture often occurs on
a local scale, the fruits of slave labor may also be incorporated directly
into the production process for goods manufactured in the United States.
One recent example that has received worldwide attention is the farming
of cocoa beans in West Africa, particularly in Ivory Coast.  West African
nations produce over forty percent of the world’s cocoa.86  Child labor-
ers, many of them imported from neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso,
are sometimes forced to work as slaves on cocoa farms and plantations.87
The cocoa beans that they produce are imported to the United States,
processed at plants in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and California, and turned
into chocolate products sold throughout the domestic market.88
C. A New Industrial Context
The ubiquitous operation of multinational corporations in global la-
bor markets represents another, dramatically new context for American
industry.  In rapidly increasing numbers, U.S.-based corporations are be-
coming involved in foreign slave practices.  In some instances, U.S. enti-
ties deliberately export components of their operations to overseas mar-
kets in order to take advantage of the radically different labor conditions
found in less developed nations.  In others, U.S. industries merely
purchase products on the global market and may be uninvolved, and un-
concerned, with the labor practices that produce them.  How are these
situations to be analyzed?  When slavery and involuntary servitude are em-
ployed on American soil, the ultimate disposition of the goods that they
produce is largely irrelevant.  The presence of an involuntary laborer it-
self offends the Thirteenth Amendment.  Ironically, this uncompromis-
ing approach to domestic slavery has produced an impoverished Thir-
teenth Amendment vocabulary.  We do not yet have the doctrinal tools
that are required to analyze the more sanitized incorporation of slavery
into American industry that has appeared in the activities of U.S. energy
corporations in Burma, or the activities of U.S. fashion producers and
manufacturers in Pakistan and Southeast Asia.
85. Id. at 81 (“In Mauritania today there is no slavery, and yet everywhere you look, on
every street corner and shop, in every field and pasture, you see slaves. . . . Mauritania’s
economy rests squarely on their backs.”); Rassam, supra note 51, 321–24 & 322 nn.72, 75 R
(describing slave practices within Mauritania and Sudan).
86. Much of America’s Sweets Made Possible Through Slave Labor on Ivory Coast,
Knight Ridder/Trib. Bus. News (Washington), June 25, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter America’s
Sweets].
87. Stopping Forced Labour, supra note 31, at 21–22; cf. Adam Jones, Chocolate R
Boycott Warning, The Financial Times (London), May 5, 2001, at 2 (quoting British
Foreign Office minister, who opposes boycott of chocolate, saying “It is clear that forced
labour is used in some sectors of the cocoa industry, though there is no evidence it is
widespread.”).
88. America’s Sweets, supra note 86, at 2. R
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And it is not just the practices of American industry that have
changed.  Slavery has evolved as well.  While chattel slavery arrangements
like those that once existed in the United States may still be found in
isolated cases, as in Mauritania, they are the exception.  The present state
of American involvement in foreign slave labor practices is quite differ-
ent.  With only rare exceptions, slavery is no longer an openly defended
institution that supporters make use of unabashedly.  Like the vectors by
which it is incorporated into American industry, the slave relationship
itself is often obscured.  Professor Bales writes:
In the past, slavery entailed one person legally owning another
person, but modern slavery is different.  Today slavery is illegal
everywhere, and there is no more legal ownership of human be-
ings.  When people buy slaves today they don’t ask for a receipt
or ownership papers, but they do gain control—and they use vio-
lence to maintain this control.  Slaveholders have all of the ben-
efits of ownership without the legalities.  Indeed, for the slave-
holders, not having legal ownership is an improvement because
they get total control without any responsibility for what they
own.89
Once again, our rejection of such innovations in slavery when they
occur domestically is well established.  The evolution in the dynamics of
slavery that Bales describes has already played out in miniature on the
domestic stage with the rise of peonage laws following the Civil War.  As
described earlier, peonage arrangements enabled employers to use the
coercive processes of the law to exercise control over indebted workers.
It permitted them to do so, moreover, without incurring any of the duties
and obligations of sentiment that had once attached to formal ownership
of slaves.  In many respects, post-Civil War peonage arrangements trans-
formed forced laborers into the “disposable people” that Bales docu-
ments at length.  The Court’s first major translation of the Thirteenth
Amendment, Pollock v. Williams, produced a substantive standard to ana-
lyze such claims.90  Under that standard, the Amendment forbids any
state from making “the quitting of work any component of a crime, or
89. Bales, supra note 52, at 5.  Bales identifies the increasingly prevalent practice of R
“contract slavery” as one of the more effective means of obscuring the true nature of the
slave relationship:
Contract slavery shows how modern labor relations are used to hide the new
slavery.  Contracts are offered that guarantee employment, perhaps in a workshop
or factory, but when the workers are taken to their place of work they find
themselves enslaved.  The contract is used as an enticement to trick an individual
into slavery, as well as a way of making the slavery look legitimate.  If legal
questions are raised, the contract can be produced, but the reality is that the
“contract worker” is a slave, threatened by violence, lacking any freedom of
movement, and paid nothing.  The most rapidly growing form of slavery, this is
the second-largest form today.  Contract slavery is most often found in Southeast
Asia, Brazil, some Arab states, and some parts of the Indian subcontinent.
Id. at 20.
90. 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
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mak[ing] criminal sanctions available for holding unwilling persons to
labor,”91 and applies (as the Court later explained) to all “situations in
which the victim is compelled to work by law” or is subjected to compul-
sion through “physical . . . coercion.”92  The peonage cases demonstrate
that our commitment to these principles is indeed a serious one.  But as
yet we have no model for applying the standard we have developed to
American corporations operating globally.
II. TRANSLATION TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
It is again necessary, then, to translate the Thirteenth Amendment’s
prohibition on the existence of slavery to a new context for American
industry.  The present generation of U.S. corporations has begun to in-
corporate slave labor into American industry by locating the slave depen-
dent components of their operations in foreign jurisdictions, just as in-
dustrialists at the turn of the century sought to accomplish that end by
locating the slave dependent components of their operations in unobjec-
tionable legal categories.  Does the Amendment prohibit such practices?
If so, how intimately must an American firm be involved in the exploita-
tion of foreign slave labor in order to offend the Amendment?  Finding
answers to these distinctively modern questions requires us to turn back
to some of America’s earliest engagements with forced labor in order to
determine the full content of the “slavery” that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment has prohibited.93
A. Analytical Foundations
To set forth the foundations of my argument concerning the foreign
slave practices of U.S. multinationals and the Thirteenth Amendment, I
offer three propositions.  Each is grounded in doctrinal principles that
already find voice in the Court’s engagement with slavery, both before
and after emancipation.  Understanding why these propositions are cor-
rect in turn helps to illustrate the conceptions of slavery—interpersonal,
institutional, and industrial—that are embodied in the Thirteenth
Amendment’s prohibition.
1. Slavery and Slave Ownership as Social Relation. — My first proposi-
tion concerns slavery’s operation on an interpersonal level.  The relation-
ship between the slave and the slave owner, and the impact that the own-
ership arrangement had upon each, was a matter of active concern in
early discussions of slavery in both American and British legal circles.  As
contemporary legal thinkers understood it, the authorized possession of
91. Id. at 18.
92. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942, 944 (1988).
93. Cf. Binder, supra note 5, at 2063–64 (arguing for “the relevance of remote and R
recent history to the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment” and against position that it
“secured little more than the manumission of slaves already practically freed by the friction
of war”).
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complete dominion by one individual over another did more than simply
create an enforceable property right in the enslaved individual.  Such do-
minion created a social relation between owner and slave—a distinctive
and robust interaction that the law of slavery recognized and took ac-
count of.  In declaring that slavery and involuntary servitude “shall not
exist” in the United States, the Thirteenth Amendment took aim, not just
at the legal recognition of property rights in a slave, but also at the social
relation of dominance that characterized both participants in the slave
relationship.  The Amendment’s eradication of this interpersonal feature
of slavery provides the foundation for my first proposition:
Proposition 1: The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits a citizen of the
United States from owning a slave, regardless of where the enslaved indi-
vidual is physically located.
A rich description of the relationship of dominance inherent in slav-
ery may be found in the writings of one of its most notorious apologists,
Judge Thomas Ruffin of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in his
opinion in State v. Mann.94  The case involved a criminal prosecution
against John Mann, who had shot and wounded a slave, Lydia, hired to
him by her owner.95  Mann was convicted of assault and battery, but the
North Carolina Supreme Court overturned the conviction, finding that
the law was required to take cognizance of the complete relationship of
dominance that a master necessarily exercised over a slave:
The end [of slavery] is the profit of the master, his security and
the public safety; the subject, one doomed in his own person,
and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the ca-
pacity to make anything his own, and to toil that another may
reap the fruits. . . . [S]uch services can only be expected from
one who has no will of his own; who surrenders his will in im-
plicit obedience to that of another.  Such obedience is the con-
sequence only of uncontrolled authority over the body.  There is
nothing else which can operate to produce the effect.  The
power of the master must be absolute, to render the submissions
of the slave perfect. . . . This discipline belongs to the state of
slavery. . . . [I]t is inherent in the relation of master and slave.96
94. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829).
95. Id. at 263.
96. Id. at 266–67.  A federal district court in Ohio offered a similar description shortly
following the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment:
[U]nconditional submission of the slave is due to the authority of the master; and
the master may, therefore, use such force and means as may be necessary to
enforce submission to his authority, even to the destruction of life or limb of the
slave.  The law of slavery is absolute authority on the part of the master, and
unconditional submission on the part of the slave.  And the master may punish
the slave at will, in such manner and degree as his judgment and humanity may
dictate, provided he does not maim or kill.  The right of the master to obedience
and submission in lawful things is perfect.  The power to inflict any punishment
not affecting life or limb, which the master considers necessary to enforce
obedience to his commands, is secured to him by the law.  Now, if in the exercise
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In his important study of the American law of slavery in the nine-
teenth century, Professor Mark Tushnet explains that this social relation
was distinct in part because of its totalistic quality—the embedded re-
quirement that the master and slave concern themselves with every aspect
of each other’s lives.97
The ill effects of this relationship of dominance upon the slave were
clear—Judge Ruffin complains of the “harshness” of the arrangement
even as he reaffirms its ascendance98—and humanitarian reactions of
sympathy for the enslaved individual lay at the heart of at least some abo-
litionist sentiment.  But the effects that the social relation of slavery had
upon the master were also a matter of concern for legal thinkers during
the age of American slavery.  The slave relationship placed the good char-
acter and morals of the owner in jeopardy.  While this concern may ring
hollow in the ears of contemporary readers when compared to the mis-
eries inflicted upon enslaved individuals, it sounded loudly at the time.
One of the principal evils of slavery, as eighteenth- and nineteenth-cen-
tury opponents understood it, was the corrupting influence that this so-
cial relation of dominance threatened to exert upon the free whites who
participated in it as owners and masters.
of his authority, the slave resists and slays the master, it is murder, and not
manslaughter, because the law cannot recognize the violence of the master as a
legitimate provocation.
Wood v. Ward, 30 F. Cas. 479, 482 (S.D. Ohio 1879) (No. 17,966) (citations omitted); see
also Jacob v. State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 493, 520 (1842) (“[T]he right to obedience and
submission, in all lawful things . . . is perfect in the master . . . .”); Amar & Widawsky, supra
note 47, at 1370 (“That slavery was at root a power relation, involving the domination of R
the master and the degradation of the slave, was not lost on antebellum judges.”).
Contemporary abolitionists described the relationship in similar terms, though
obviously drawing very different conclusions.  See, e.g., William Goodell, The American
Slave Code 155 (William Loren Katz & James M. McPherson eds., Arno Press 1969) (1853)
(“We have seen that ‘the legal relation’ of slave ownership, being the relation of an owner
to his property, invests him with unlimited power.”).
97. Mark V. Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery 1810–1860, at 6 (1981).  Tushnet
contrasts the social relation of slavery with the more limited form of interaction typical of
participants in a market:
Social relations in slave society rest upon the interaction of owner with slave; the
owner, having total dominion over the slave, relates to the entire personality of
the slave.  In contrast, bourgeois social relations rest upon the paradigmatic
instance of market relations, the purchase by a capitalist of a worker’s labor
power; that transaction implicates only a part of the worker’s personality.  Slave
social relations are total, engaging the master and the slave in exchanges where
each must take account of the entire range of belief, feeling, and interest
embodied in the other; bourgeois social relations are partial, requiring only that
participants in a market evaluate their general productive characteristics without
regard to aspects of personality unrelated to production.  Ways of interpreting
slave conduct are developed from slave social relations and are ultimately
embodied in the law . . . .
Id.
98. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 266.
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Concern over this baleful influence among owners and masters
played a role in several interjurisdictional cases, in which courts in free
jurisdictions were called upon to determine the extent to which slavery
could be tolerated within their bounds in some mediated form—either
on a transitory basis, as when slave owners sought to travel in the jurisdic-
tion temporarily with slaves in tow, or on an attenuated basis, as when
citizens of the free state owned slaves located elsewhere.  In placing limits
on even the mediated presence of slavery within their boundaries, the
courts of some free jurisdictions relied in part upon the nature of the
social relation that attends the slave system.  These courts found that the
goal of excluding “slavery” from the jurisdiction could not be accom-
plished without targeting both halves of the social relation:  owner and
enslaved individual.
The roots of this understanding may be found in Somerset v. Stewart,99
surely the most important interjurisdictional slavery case in Britain or
America before Dred Scott itself.  The case arose in England in 1772, when
slavery had essentially been abolished in that country,100 and concerned
the question of whether a slave from another jurisdiction could sue for
freedom upon being brought to free English soil by his owner.  Somerset,
the slave, was brought to England by Stewart, his owner, a resident of
Virginia who had acquired Somerset in Jamaica.  It was Stewart’s inten-
tion to transact some business in England and then travel to Jamaica with
Somerset and sell him again; but Somerset, having been left in the care of
one Captain Knowles, obtained local assistance to petition for a writ of
habeas corpus that would free him from bondage.101
There was no question that Stewart held title of ownership to Somer-
set under the laws of Virginia; the question was whether that legal rela-
tion was subject to enforcement in the English courts when Stewart
brought Somerset to England.  Lord Mansfield found that it was not:
The exclusion of slavery from English shores necessarily prohibited the
enforcement of the master-slave relationship on even a transitory basis,
and hence the courts of England were obliged to grant Somerset his
freedom.102
Somerset set forth two interrelated doctrinal principles that are impor-
tant for present purposes.  The first was the requirement that the subjuga-
tion of the slave be sustained by positive legal enactment. Somerset’s hold-
ing—that a slave could sue for freedom when brought to English soil—
99. 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772).
100. There may have remained some vestiges of the English practice of “villenage”—a
system of bonded servitude held over from feudal days—at this time.  The continued
vitality of villenage was a matter of dispute between the parties in the Somerset case.  In its
opinion, the court entertained the possibility that the legal status of villenage might still
exist in some form in England, but considered the matter irrelevant to its disposition of the
case.  Id. at 500, 510.
101. Id. at 499.
102. Id. at 510.
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rested on the conclusion that because the slave relation had no ground-
ing in natural law, it could be sustained, if at all, only by municipal regula-
tions in the forum where the slave relationship was sought to be en-
forced.103  This question of positive law, and the doctrine of comity that
Lord Mansfield invoked in resolving it, were the principle issues with
which the Somerset court was concerned, and they are the propositions for
which the case is usually cited.  Intimately bound up with that holding,
however, was the related issue of the legal origins of the master-slave rela-
tion:  When a recognizing forum does provide positive legal support for
the slave relation of another jurisdiction, what is the nature of the legal
relation it is supporting?  As future courts would go on to discuss more
explicitly, a regulation that supports the slave relation is upholding a le-
gally enacted “status.”104  As with the marital relation, the slave relation
governed the personhood and citizenship status of each participant
before the law.  Under the nascent choice of law doctrines of the nine-
teenth century, enactments affecting an individual’s personhood or citi-
zenship proceeded primarily from the law of the person’s domicile,105
and this precept held equally true for the status of participants in the
slave relation.106  As a practical matter, this generally meant that the slave
103. Justice Story later echoed this pronouncement for the Supreme Court in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 611 (1842) (“[N]o nation is bound to recognise the
state of slavery, as to foreign slaves found within its territorial dominions, when it is in
opposition to its own policy and institutions . . . .”).
104. Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 217 (1836); Lemmon v. People,
20 N.Y. 562, 603–04 (1860).
105. As Justice Story wrote in his Commentaries:
[M]arriage [unlike other contracts] is a contract sui generis, and the rights, duties,
and obligations, which arise out of it, are matters of so much importance to the
well-being of the State, that they are regulated, not by the private contract, but by
the public laws of the State, which are imperative on all, who are domiciled within
its territory.  If a man in this country were to confine his wife in an iron cage, or to
beat her with a rod of the thickness of the Judge’s finger, would it be a
justification in any court, to allege, that these were powers, which the law of
England conferred on a husband, and that he was entitled to the exercise of
them, because his marriage had been celebrated in that country?
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, ch. V, § 111
(3d ed. 1846).  The civil status of married parties under the incidents of the marital
relationship is not to be confused with the validity of the marriage itself, which is generally
governed by the place of celebration.  Id. ch. V, § 113.
The advocates for the losing party in Somerset themselves invoked the similarity in legal
structure between the slave and marital relations, arguing that a victory for Somerset would
suggest that a hostile forum would also be empowered to disregard a foreign marriage.
Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 506 (“The relation of husband and wife, I think myself warranted
in questioning, as a natural relation:  does it subsist for life; or to answer the natural
purposes which may reasonably be supposed often to terminate sooner?  Yet this is one of
those relations which follow a man every where.”).
106. Story, supra note 105, ch. IV, § 96 (noting the “uniformity of opinion among R
foreign jurists . . . in giving no effect to the state of slavery of a party, whatever it might have
been in the country . . . in which he had been previously domiciled, unless it is also
recognised by the laws of the country of his actual domicil”); Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at
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relation was governed by the law of the master’s domicile.107  In Somerset
itself, for example, the court indicated that Stewart remained a domicili-
ary of Virginia,108 and hence that it was the laws of Virginia that would
govern the relation between Somerset and Stewart unless denied enforce-
ment by the courts of England.109
This second doctrinal principle concerning the legal status of the
master under the law of his domicile, though often discussed only in pass-
ing, forms an important component of the legal framework within which
interjurisdictional cases like Somerset operated.  Rendered more precisely,
the question posed in the interjurisdictional cases was whether there ex-
isted any basis in the positive law of the second forum (England, in the
case of Somerset) for recognizing and enforcing the legal statuses of
“master” and “slave” brought into being under the law of the first, domi-
ciliary forum.  The slave relation, in other words, had to be supported
both by the positive legal enactments of the owner’s domicile and by the
positive legal enactments of any jurisdiction to which the slave was physi-
cally transported.  The result in Somerset flowed from that court’s conclu-
sion that a sovereign possessed the right to regulate the status not only of
its domiciliaries, but also of people physically traveling within its territory,
and thus could deny positive legal support to the status of “master” or
“slave” created by another jurisdiction.110
In explaining its holding, the Somerset court embraced a characteriza-
tion of the slave relation that would influence the analysis in subsequent
interjurisdictional cases.  Mansfield rested his conclusion about the posi-
tive law foundations of the slave relation on the conclusion that
The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of
being introduced on any reasons, moral or political; but only
positive law, which preserves its force long after the reasons, oc-
casion, and time itself from whence it was created, is erased
217 (explaining that “status, or condition” of slave is determined first by law of domiciliary
state).
107. See, e.g., Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 462 (1857) (describing
domicile of Dred Scott, which followed that of his owner).
108. Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510 (“Mr. Stewart, having occasion to transact business,
came over hither, with an intention to return [to Virginia] . . . .”).
109. Id. at 509 (“The now question is, whether any dominion, authority or coercion
can be exercised in this country, on a slave according to the American laws?”); id. at 510
(“The captain of the ship on board of which the negro was taken, makes his return to the
writ in terms signifying that . . . the trade in [slaves] is authorized by the laws and opinions
of Virginia and Jamaica; that they are goods and chattels; and, as such, saleable and sold.”).
The allusion to Jamaican law in the second passage refers to the legality of both the
original contract of sale for Somerset and his anticipated resale by Stewart—issues that the
court had touched upon earlier in its opinion.  Id. at 509.
110. See Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 603–04 (1860) (asserting “the right of a
sovereign State to determine the status of persons within its jurisdiction” and discussing
that principle in light of Somerset).
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from memory:  it’s so odious, that nothing can be suffered to
support it, but positive law.111
In his short opinion explaining the disposition of the case, Mansfield
does not expand upon those aspects of slavery that are so “odious” as to
require this result.  But that issue is squarely addressed in the arguments
of Francis Hargrave, Somerset’s counsel, which alone are endorsed by the
court and singled out for particular praise among those arguments repro-
duced with the opinion.112  Hargrave explains that the slave relation ex-
erts deleterious effects upon the owner as well as the slave:
Let us reflect on the consequences of servitude in a light still
more important.  The corruption of manners in the master,
from the entire subjection of the slaves he possesses to his sole
will; from whence spring forth luxury, pride, cruelty, with the
infinite enormities appertaining to their train; the danger to the
master, from the revenge of his much injured and unredressed
dependent; debasement of the mind of the slave, for want of
means and motives of improvement; and peril to the constitu-
tion under which the slave cannot but suffer, and which he will
naturally endeavour to subvert, as the only means of retrieving
comfort and security to himself.113
The institution of slavery was “odious,” not merely for the misery that
it inflicted upon the slave, but also for the threat that it posed to the
character and morals of the master.  In this assertion, Hargrave drew
upon a vocabulary of slavery that was well established.114  Thomas Jeffer-
son (himself a slave owner)115 embraced similar sentiments in his con-
temporaneous Notes on Virginia, in which he decried the impact that the
111. Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 509.
112. The prefatory materials to the opinion of the Court report:
Upon the second argument, (Ser[g]eant Glynn was in the first, and, I think,
Mr. Mansfield) the pleading on behalf of the negro was opened by Mr. Hargrave.
I need not say that it will be found at large, and I presume has been read by most
of the profession, he having obliged the public with it himself:  but I hope this
summary note, which I took of it at the time, will not be thought impertinent; as it
is not easy for a cause in which that gentleman has appeared, not to be materially
injured by a total omission of his share in it.
Id. at 499.
As this excerpt implies, Hargrave published the full text of his argument as a
pamphlet, which still exists.  Francis Hargrave, An Argument in the Case of James
Sommersett a Negro, reprinted in 1 Slavery, Race and the American Legal System,
1700–1872:  Southern Slaves in Free State Courts 1, 1–82 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988)
[hereinafter Slavery and Race].
113. Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 500.
114. Professor Ashworth gives primacy of place to the social relation between master
and slave in his discussion of the gradual move toward abolition, asserting that during
antislavery debates, “the relationship between slave and slaveholder, rather than the mere
existence of the market, was at the center of attention.”  John Ashworth, Capitalism, Class,
and Antislavery, in The Antislavery Debate:  Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in
Historical Interpretation 276, 276–80 (Thomas Bender ed., 1992).
115. Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx:  The Character of Thomas Jefferson 144–52
(1996).
\\Server03\productn\C\COL\102-4\COL403.txt unknown Seq: 29  7-MAY-02 17:50
2002] THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND GLOBAL SLAVERY 1001
exercise of dominance in a slave relationship had upon the morals and
character of the master:
The whole commerce between master and slave is a perpet-
ual exercise of the most boisterous passions, the most unremit-
ting despotism on the one part, and degrading submissions on
the other.  Our children see this, and learn to imitate it. . . . The
man must be a prodigy who can retain his manners and morals
undepraved by such circumstances.  And with what execration
should the statesman be loaded, who, permitting one half the
citizens thus to trample on the rights of the other, transforms
those into despots, and these into enemies, destroys the morals
of the one part, and the amor patriae of the other.116
And these harms in turn corresponded to the two sources of positive
law necessary to support the slave relation in an interjurisdictional case:
the law of the forum where the slave was located, necessary to impose an
unnatural and injurious state of servitude upon the slave; and the law of
the master’s domicile, necessary to invest the master with an unnatural
and dangerous power of dominance.
The result in the Somerset case resounded throughout subsequent le-
gal analyses of interjurisdictional slavery disputes in America.  Most of
Somerset’s progeny focused principally upon its holding that the positive
law of the forum is necessary to support the servitude of a slave.  Thus, in
the free States of Massachusetts and Ohio, courts embraced Somerset and
held that a slave may secure his freedom when his owner voluntarily
brings him to free soil.117  And those who would deny the ability of slaves
116. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia:  1781–1782, in 8 The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson 403–04 (H.A. Washington ed., Washington, Taylor & Maury 1854).  As Professor
Ellis explains, Jefferson later stepped away from these abolitionist sentiments, which were
not intended for an American audience and did not sit comfortably with the elite members
of Virginia gentility.  See Ellis, supra note 115, at 145–47. R
117. Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 210–11 (1836); Birney v. State, 8
Ohio 230, 236–37 (1837); see also Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 615 (1860) (same result
for New York).
The Supreme Court of Louisiana (a slave state) adopted one of the most aggressive
interpretations of the Somerset principle.  In Marie Louise, F.W.C. [“Free Woman of Color”]
v. Marot, 9 La. 473, 474 (1835), the court considered a claim for freedom brought by Marie
Louise, a slave owned by a citizen of Louisiana.  Louise had been brought by her owners to
France, which was then a free jurisdiction.  Upon returning with her owners to Louisiana,
Louise sued for her freedom, claiming that her transport to a free jurisdiction had severed
the bonds of slavery.  The court agreed, issuing the broad holding that “Being free for one
moment in France, it was not in the power of her former owner to reduce her again to
slavery.” Marie Louise, 9 La. at 476.
This result was the consequence of the positive law approach to the institution of
slavery.  Even among states that continued to defend the institution of slavery, there was an
emerging recognition (or admission) that slavery was not a “natural” status—that is, not a
relationship that reflected deeper truths in the relationship between living things in the
world.  Thus, slavery could only be supported by positive legal enactments—it had no
independent grounding in the natural law tradition.  See, e.g., id.  An aggressive reading of
this position held that the status of slave and master had to be supported at all times by
positive legal enactments.  If it ceased to be supported by positive legal enactments at any
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to sue for their freedom after being brought into free jurisdictions—in-
cluding, ultimately, the Supreme Court in Dred Scott itself—felt obliged to
respond to Somerset and distinguish or reject it.118  In such cases, the role
of the master’s domicile remained largely implicit.  But one of the most
prominent of Somerset’s progeny—the opinion of the New York Court of
Appeals in Lemmon v. People—placed explicit reliance upon the interrela-
tionship between positive legal enactment, citizenship status, and the two-
fold impact of the slave relation upon both master and slave.119
In Lemmon, a slave owner voluntarily brought a slave to the free juris-
diction of New York to initiate the ocean-going leg of a trip between Vir-
ginia (where the owner resided) and Texas.  Like the courts of Massachu-
setts, Ohio, and others before it,120 the New York Court of Appeals
embraced Somerset and held that a slave becomes free when his owner
voluntarily brings him to free soil.  In Lemmon, however, the court explic-
itly grounded its holding in an extended discussion of the social relation
between master and slave, which, the court found, the legislature had
absolutely abolished from the State of New York.  The court acknowl-
edged that the social relation of slavery flowed from the power of the
domiciliary state to “determine and regulate the status or social and civil
condition of her citizens”121—a power that necessarily followed the domi-
cile of the master, since “slaves certainly are not citizens.”122  In refusing
to permit the transport of slaves through New York, the Lemmon court
found that the New York legislature had completely forbidden the status
of either slave owner or slave to exist within the polity or territory of New
York.  This was so, the members of the majority explained, because even a
mediated or attenuated presence of slavery would bring with it the social
relation that constituted one of the evils that New York had sought to
exclude:
moment, the relation failed entirely and could not be revived by the subsequent
restoration of legal support.  In an era when conflict of laws principles were almost entirely
territorial in their operation, this reading held that a slave who was transported to a free
jurisdiction immediately became free, even if she did not sue for her freedom until she
returned to the state that had enslaved her.  See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539,
611 (1842) (Story, J.) (describing necessity for support of slave relationship by positive
law); Christopher L.M. Eisgruber, Justice Story, Slavery, and the Natural Law Foundations
of American Constitutionalism, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 273, 280 & n.24 (1988) (discussing Prigg
and Somerset).  The English courts themselves did not adopt such an aggressive position,
holding that a slave had to sue for her freedom in England in order to take advantage of
the Somerset holding.  The Slave, Grace, 166 Eng. Rep. 179, 183 (Adm. 1827).
118. See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 485 (1856) (Daniel, J.,
concurring); Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 196–205 (reproducing arguments of counsel
seeking to distinguish Somerset).
119. 20 N.Y. at 603–10.
120. See Milly v. Smith, 2 Mo. 36, 38 (1838); supra note 117.  See also Ellis v. Welch, R
38 S.C.L. (4 Rich.) 468, 476-78 (S.C. Ct. App. 1851) (assuming that Somerset doctrine
would apply in Pennsylvania or New York and finding that master of vessel must employ
high standard of care when determining whether Negro passengers are slaves).
121. Lemmon, 20 N.Y. at 616.
122. Id. at 610.
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It is not denied that New York has effectually exerted her
sovereignty to the extent that the relation of slave owner and
slave cannot be maintained by her citizens, or persons or citi-
zens of any other State or nation domiciled within her territory
. . . , and that this she might rightfully do. . . . [W]hen the do-
mestic laws reject and suppress the status [of slave and slave
owner] as a civil condition or social relation, as matter of reason
and authority it is never upheld in the case of strangers resident
or in transit.123
A further logical consequence of this holding would seem to be that
citizens of New York were absolutely prohibited from owning slaves, even
if the enslaved individuals were located elsewhere.  The foundation of the
interjurisdictional cases, made explicit by Lemmon, is that the slave rela-
tion must be supported both by the positive legal enactments of the
owner’s domicile and by the positive legal enactments of any state to
which the slave is physically transported.  The law of the domicile creates
the status of “master” and “slave,” while the law of the forum is required
to maintain those statuses against the natural state of liberty in which
men and women otherwise exist, and the basis of the Lemmon court’s de-
cision concerning slaves in transit was that “New York has effectually ex-
erted her sovereignty to the extent that the relation of slave owner and
slave cannot be maintained by her citizens, or persons or citizens of any
other State or nation domiciled within her territory.”124  By the terms of
the court’s opinion, the positive legal authority to enjoy the status of
“slave owner” was removed from domiciliaries of New York.
While Lemmon does not squarely address this consequence of New
York’s abolition of the social relation of slavery (not surprisingly, since
the case dealt only with an owner from a slave state who physically trans-
ported her slave through New York), the proposition that New York citi-
zens may not own slaves does appear to be embedded in the laws of the
state and reaffirmed by the Lemmon majority.  In discussing the reasons
for its holding concerning slaves in transit, for example, the court ex-
plains that, if an out of state resident were permitted to bring a slave
through the jurisdiction, one consequence would be that, “as one of the
chief attributes of property,” she could “sell or dispose of” that slave.125  A
New York resident, however, could not be the purchaser:
[The out of State owner] could not, perhaps, sell them to a citi-
zen of New York, who would at all events be bound by our laws,
but any other citizen of a slave State—who would equally bring
with him the immunities and privileges of his own State—might
lawfully traffic in the slave property.126
123. Id. at 617–18 (opinion of Wright, J.).
124. Id. at 617.
125. Id. at 610.
126. Id.
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The laws of New York, in other words, forbade New York citizens
from purchasing slaves, even in circumstances where the resident of a
slave state could legally do so.  A similar prohibition is reflected in earlier
versions of the laws regulating the transitory presence of slaves in the
State.  In 1830, for example, the legislature reenacted laws prohibiting
the importation of slaves into New York but made an exception for slaves
carried through the State on a transitory basis.127  That exception, how-
ever, was available only to inhabitants of other states.  It read:
Any person, not being an inhabitant of this State, who shall be
traveling to or from, or passing through this State, may bring
with him any person lawfully held in slavery, and may take such
person with him from this State; but the person so held in slav-
ery shall not reside or continue in this State more than nine
months; if such residence be continued beyond that time such
person shall be free.128
(The 1841 law that governed the dispute in Lemmon eliminated this ex-
ception.)129  Inhabitants of New York, unlike out-of-staters, were never
allowed to have slaves within the State, even on a transitory basis.130
Thus, the law of New York apparently forbade to its residents all of the
incidents of slavery, including any form of participation in the master-
slave relation.131
Lemmon is also worthy of special note in that, unlike its predecessors,
the New York court rendered its decision following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Dred Scott—and, it would not be an exaggeration to say, in
open defiance of that decision.  The Court in Dred Scott had recognized a
127. See id. at 601 (discussing N.Y. Rev. Stat., pt. 1, ch. 20, tit. 7 (1836)).
128. Id. (quoting N.Y. Rev. Stat., pt. 1, ch. 20, tit. 7, § 6 (1830)).  See also id. at 618–19
(explaining evolution of New York antislavery laws containing exceptions that applied only
to “an inhabitant of another State”).
129. See id. at 601–02.
130. Such an approach was almost certainly influenced by Quaker abolitionist
sentiments, which played an influential role in shaping antislavery attitudes in the North.
As Professor Davis writes, “It would be difficult to exaggerate the central role Quakers
played in initiating and sustaining the first antislavery movements.”  David Brion Davis, The
Quaker Ethic and the Antislavery International (1975), reprinted in The Antislavery
Debate, supra note 114, at 27, 29.  Before the founding of the Republic, Northern Quakers R
adopted a policy requiring their members to take all possible steps to manumit slaves and
forbidding them to participate, even indirectly, in their sale or transfer.  Id.
131. New York embraced such a strong abolitionist sentiment only after contending
with the issue of slavery for many years.  See generally Alvin Kass, Politics in New York State
1800–1830, at 81–89 (1965) (describing slow and highly politically charged process by
which New York legislated general emancipation).  The uncompromising policy revealed
in Lemmon was the result of a very gradual ratcheting up of New York antislavery laws.  See
Lemmon, 20 N.Y. at 600–02.  And even after adopting an official stance of prohibition, New
York still served as one of the major centers for the outfitting of ships engaged in the illicit
slave trade.  See Ernest A. McKay, The Civil War and New York City 13–15 (1990)
(describing continued economic benefits to New York of slave labor and slave trade, and
popular resistance to dictates of emancipation); infra notes 160–163 and accompanying R
text.
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slave owner’s interest in his slaves (the res of the master-slave relation-
ship) as a robust property right with deep constitutional foundations.132
That holding called into serious question the ability of free states to abro-
gate the property rights of transient slave owners or otherwise to restrict
their movement, as states like Ohio and Massachusetts had done through
the decisions of their highest courts.133  Lemmon was a deliberate state-
ment of resistance to Dred Scott.  Indeed, as Professor Finkelman has writ-
ten, Lemmon would likely have been overruled by the Supreme Court had
the Civil War not overtaken events.134  And Dred Scott, in turn, was one of
the statements of law that the Union most explicitly rejected when it en-
acted the Reconstruction Amendments.
Thus, in the wake of Dred Scott, the character of slavery as a social
relation was distinctly present in the American legal vocabulary.  As Har-
grave had put it one hundred years earlier in terms that continued to
galvanize slavery opponents, that relation could lead to the “corruption
of manners in the master” and threatened to produce in him “luxury,
pride [and] cruelty, with the infinite enormities appertaining to their
train.”135  Thus it was that the New York Court of Appeals, in continuing
to resist the incursion of slavery following Dred Scott, took deliberate aim
at both the status of “slave” and the status of “master” within New York.
This concern over the “corruption of manners” among employers
and industrialists also continued to find voice in the ratification debates
for the Thirteenth Amendment, in discussions over both the moral and
economic imperatives demanding the elimination of slavery and all its
vestiges.  As Professor VanderVelde has demonstrated, one serious con-
cern among the members of Congress who debated the Amendment was
the hostile climate that the slave system created toward free Southern
laborers, including poor whites.136  The existence of slavery, these legisla-
132. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 425 (1856) (“The only two
provisions [of the Constitution] which point to [Africans brought to America] and include
them, treat them as property, and make it the duty of the government to protect [that
property] . . . .”).
133. As one dissenting judge wrote in Lemmon:
If, then, by the law of nations, the citizen of one government has a right of
passage with what is recognized as property by that law, through the territory of
another, peaceably, and that too without the latter’s acquiring any right of
control over the person or property, is not a citizen of any State of this
confederacy entitled, under the compact upon which it is founded, to a right of
passage through the territory of any other State, with what that compact
recognises as property, without the latter’s acquiring any right of control over that
property.
Lemmon, 20 N.Y. at 641 (Clerke, J., dissenting).
134. Paul Finkelman, Introduction to Slavery and Race, supra note 112, at xiii. R
135. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 500 (K.B. 1772); see also Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 292 (1897) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Slavery exists wherever the law
recognizes a right of property in a human being, but slavery cannot exist in any form
within the United States.”).
136. VanderVelde, supra note 38, at 470–74. R
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tors argued, “degraded labor,” even among free populations, by inspiring
employers to act with impunity toward vulnerable workers.  The slave sys-
tem’s “corruption of morals” in the master and the industrialist rein-
forced them in the exploitation of laborers generally.137  As one legislator
put it, the system of slavery perpetuated “the atrocious sentiment that it
was better for society that the capitalists of the country should own the laborers,
whether white or black” and thereby “degrade the laboring classes to a
condition below that of the peasantry of Europe and render it impossible
for them to rise in society.”138
Following Reconstruction, as the need arose to translate the com-
mand of the Thirteenth Amendment to address the emerging practice of
peonage, courts continued to recognize this concern over the corruption
of manners in those who exploit forced labor as one of the Amendment’s
central principles.  Thus, in explaining that debt slavery violates the Thir-
teenth Amendment, a federal district court in Alabama wrote of the
emerging peonage schemes:
The improvidence and the needs of laborers and servants, the
greed of employers, and the exercise, often corrupt, of almost
irresponsible power of local magistrates, resulted in citizens be-
coming bound, in constantly increasing numbers and length of
service, to compulsory “service or labor” to coerce payment of
debt or compel the performance of real or pretended obliga-
tions of personal service.  The evils of the system not only de-
graded those who were subjected to the system, but exercised a
baleful influence upon all other classes, which in innumerable
ways fought against the industrial prosperity and moral advance-
ment of the people among whom the “system” [of peonage] was
enforced.  It was wholly out of keeping with the spirit of the
amendment to the Constitution, which forbids involuntary servi-
tude, except upon due conviction of crime.139
These evils, the court went on to emphasize, were equally “produc-
tive of public ill when brought about by lawless force on the part of indi-
viduals, as when upheld by state or territorial law or custom.”140
137. See id. at 472–73 & 472 n.150 (canvassing expressions of concern among
members of Congress during ratification debates).
138. Id. at 472 (quoting Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2955 (1864) (remarks of
Francisco Kellogg of Michigan) (alteration in original)).
139. The Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 674–75 (M.D. Ala. 1903); see also United States
v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 566 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that federal antislavery statute passed
shortly after enactment of Thirteenth Amendment “must be read not only to render
criminal the evil Congress sought to eradicate so long ago but, as well, its Twentieth
Century counterpart”).
140. Peonage Cases, 123 F. at 677.  Judge Easterbrook expressed a similar sentiment in
American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut:
People often act in accordance with the images and patterns they find around
them.  People raised in a religion tend to accept the tenets of that religion, often
without independent examination.  People taught from birth that black people
are fit only for slavery rarely rebelled against that creed; beliefs coupled with the
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The wages of slavery and forced labor, in other words, included a
threat of cascading impacts flowing from the relation of master and slave.
This was true wherever dominance and subservience was enforced
through threat of prosecution or violence, whether the relation was one
of true chattel slavery or episodic forced labor.  That relation constituted
both an intrinsic evil, in the immediate harms that it inflicted upon the
slave, and a secondary evil, in the behaviors that it inspired in the master.
The Thirteenth Amendment aimed to eradicate both ills.  It was against
this background that the Court pronounced in the Slaughter-House Cases
that, “In [the] struggle [of the Civil War] slavery, as a legalized social
relation, perished.”141
I observed earlier that the Thirteenth Amendment, free of any state
action requirement, imposes substantive limitations upon the nature of
the private social and economic relationships that can exist within the
United States.142  The opinion of the majority in the Lemmon case, issued
in open defiance of Dred Scott, helps to illuminate a part of what those
substantive limitations must entail.  The status of “slave owner” or
“master”; the enjoyment of an “entire subjection” of another human be-
ing under one’s “sole will”; these were among the distinct and indepen-
dent evils associated with slavery that those who drafted the Thirteenth
Amendment sought to eradicate.  As the Supreme Court went on to say in
Bailey v. Alabama, one of the peonage cases discussed earlier:
The plain intention [of the Thirteenth Amendment] was to
abolish slavery of whatever name and form and all its badges
and incidents; . . . to make labor free, by prohibiting that con-
trol by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or
self-interest of the masters established a social structure that inflicted great harm
while enduring for centuries.
771 F.2d 323, 328–29 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
141. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 68 (1872).  In his treatise on the African
slave trade, published thirty years after the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment,
W.E.B. Du Bois offers an affecting description of the impact of the slave relationship upon
the morality of the owner or master:
An economic system based on slave labor will find, sooner or later, that the
demand for the cheapest slave labor cannot long be withstood.  Once degrade
the laborer so that he cannot assert his own rights, and there is but one limit
below which his price cannot be reduced.  That limit is not his physical well-
being, for it may be, and in the Gulf States it was, cheaper to work him rapidly to
death; the limit is simply the cost of procuring him and keeping him alive a
profitable length of time.  Only the moral sense of a community can keep
helpless labor from sinking to this level; and when a community has once been
debauched by slavery, its moral sense offers little resistance to economic demand.
This was the case in the West Indies and Brazil; and although better moral
stamina held the crisis back longer in the United States, yet even here the ethical
standard of the South was not able to maintain itself against the demands of the
cotton industry.
W.E. Burghardt Du Bois, The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the United States
of America 1638–1870, at 168–69 (La. State Univ. Press 1969) (1896).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 24–31. R
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coerced for another’s benefit which is the essence of involuntary
servitude.143
Just as the State of New York prohibited its citizens from participat-
ing in the social relation of slavery, so the Thirteenth Amendment pro-
hibits citizens and residents of the United States from enjoying a property
interest in a laborer or otherwise exercising the complete dominion of a
slave master.144  The Amendment eradicated the social relation of slavery
in America.  Of necessity, it eradicated both the status of “slave” and the
status of “master” to accomplish this end.
2. Slavery as Interconnected Institution. — From the interpersonal, I
turn next to the operation of slavery on an institutional level.  It is a com-
monplace to refer to slavery as an “institution,” particularly when refer-
ring to the “peculiar institution” of chattel slavery that existed in pre-Civil
War America.  The syntax aims at capturing the elaborate body of ritual
and praxis that surrounded the systematic exploitation of involuntary la-
bor in America.  The American practice of slavery involved complemen-
tary bodies of ritual in both the public and private spheres.  How these
bodies of ritual interact—and, in particular, what institutional support
structures enabled the practice of slavery to function—is a vital area of
inquiry if one seeks to understand the interrelated issues of how legalized
slavery operated before the Civil War and what body of practices the Thir-
teenth Amendment eradicated in the war’s aftermath.  My principal focus
in this Part will be on one of the most notorious of the supporting institu-
tions that permitted slavery to function, the foreign slave trade, and on
the enforcement strategies that the Supreme Court ratified in the prose-
cutions that curtailed it.  This inquiry into the “supporting institutions” of
slavery provides the foundation for my second proposition:
Proposition 2: The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits U.S. entities from
engaging directly in the business of supporting slavery, even if the en-
slaved individuals are located wholly within foreign jurisdictions.
The suggestion that one cannot understand slavery without under-
standing the interaction of multiple, intersecting institutions is not a new
one.  Professor Mark Tushnet’s canonical work on the operation of slav-
ery through the institution of law provides one example of such an in-
quiry.145  Tushnet has traced in detail the manner in which Southern slav-
ery navigated between legal and domestic institutions.  In the public
sphere, elaborate legal doctrines governed the economic rights that both
owners and third parties could claim with respect to the activities and
disposition of slave laborers.  In the private sphere, a body of hortatory
ethical traditions, categorically referred to as “sentiment,” arose to de-
143. 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911).
144. Cf. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 47, at 1383 (“For those who seek to vindicate R
substantive rights to real world protection, few provisions of the Constitution are as
substantive or realist—concerned with de facto power—as the Thirteenth Amendment.”
(footnote omitted)).
145. Tushnet, supra note 97. R
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scribe the obligations that a slave owner should understand himself to
owe to the slaves in his charge.146  These traditions of law and sentiment
naturally served multiple ends.  For example, traditions of sentiment, in
addition to providing norms for the governance of home life, also rein-
forced a presumption of privacy within the home that protected slave
owners from having their domestic practices questioned by legal authori-
ties.147  Nor did law and sentiment always operate in harmony, as Tushnet
explains in great depth.148  Even so, this uneasy marriage of legally regu-
lated market relations and jealously guarded personal prerogatives cre-
ated a functional, if shifting, framework.  The important observation for
present purposes is that the existence of such bodies of tradition and
doctrine was a necessary and inevitable element of the incorporation of
slave labor into American industry.  Despite collateral agendas that were
at times incompatible, law and sentiment served their primary purpose:
They formed complementary institutions that permitted slave relation-
ships—and, hence, slave-dependent industries—to function in stable and
predictable ways.149
A similar observation may be made about the more quotidian details
of the practice of slavery.  Just as slavery utilized an internal structure of
institutional forms to promote its effective and stable operation, so it in-
146. Id. at 44–45.
147. See, e.g., id. at 168–69 (discussing treatment of slaves in ownership disputes and
explaining that “Although allowing state intervention in transactions between masters,
[state courts’ policy of treating all slaves alike] minimized the intrusion on master-slave
relations, by eliminating detailed inquiry into individual relations”).
148. Professor Tushnet convincingly argues that systems of regulation relying upon
sentiment and systems of regulation relying upon law were deeply incompatible, giving rise
to tensions that consistently plagued the administration of slave institutions in the South:
Developing a stable body of law [in the slave South] proved extremely
difficult. . . . The short explanation is that concern with humanity arose from one
set of social relations whereas concern for [economic] interest arose from
another set, and although those social relations coexisted in the slave South, they
could not be integrated into a unified social formation, one that lacked internal
contradiction.
Id. at 6.
Nonetheless, slavery functioned.  Indeed, the institution survived longer than many
expected at the founding of the Republic.  Opponents of slavery accepted the
constitutional compromise that permitted slavery to continue but authorized federal
restrictions on the foreign slave trade twenty years after ratification in part because they
believed that slavery would die a natural death once the trade was restricted.  See Du Bois,
supra note 141, at 61–65.  For further discussion of these issues, see infra text R
accompanying notes 153–157. R
149. Thus, in State v. Mann, the court explicitly justified its deference to the domestic
prerogatives of the white male householder as necessary to the continued functioning of
slavery:
We cannot allow the right of the master to be brought into discussion in the
Courts of Justice.  The slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible that there is
no appeal from his master; that his power is in no instance usurped; but is
conferred by the laws of man at least, if not by the law of God.
13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 267 (1829).
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teracted externally with other institutions that served to support and pro-
mote the slave system in its day to day operation.  Consider, for example,
the auction block—that powerfully symbolic stage on which enslaved peo-
ple were displayed and sold in Southern slaveholding states.  The block
itself was an institutional form that was internal to the slave system, one of
its devices.150  But auction blocks were typically located within external
rituals—a town fair, for example, or a courthouse sale—that supported
the auction block and enabled it to function by providing an occasion for
potential purchasers to come together in an atmosphere conducive to
commerce.151  Such an external ritual, in other words, operated as a “sup-
porting institution” for the slave system and the auction block—a practice
external to the institution of slavery itself that nonetheless served a vital
role in permitting one of the forms of that institution to function.  Again,
interrelated systems of ritual and praxis contributed to the stable and ef-
fective exploitation of forced labor.152
This notion of “supporting institutions” is one that the pre-Recon-
struction Supreme Court recognized and relied upon on in a series of
decisions addressing one practice within the institution of slavery:  the
foreign slave trade.  In the Slave Trade Cases,153 the Court confronted
the question of what types of activities constituted sufficient evidence to
support a forfeiture proceeding for participation in the foreign slave
trade.  The Court’s conclusion in these cases rested on a recognition of
the role that certain supporting institutions, external to the trade in
slaves itself, played in enabling the trade to function and remain profita-
ble.  Before examining the Slave Trade Cases in detail, however, a brief
description of the history of the slave trade in America is in order.
The relationship between the domestic institution of slavery and the
foreign slave trade during the seventy-five years between the ratification
of the Constitution and the signing of the Emancipation Proclamation
was a complicated one.  Contrary to the conventional wisdom of an aboli-
tionist North and a slave-supporting South, attitudes (both official and
un-) toward the continuation of the slave trade did not divide neatly by
region, nor did they remain constant throughout the first half of the
nineteenth century.  Powerful economic interests in the North sometimes
favored the continuation of the trade, much of which passed through
Northern ports, while Southern interests, both economic and social,
strongly opposed the trade at times.  By the same token, the official status
150. Thomas D. Russell, A New Image of the Slave Auction:  An Empirical Look at the
Role of Law in Slave Sales and a Conceptual Reevaluation of Slave Property, 18 Cardozo L.
Rev. 473, 473–75 (1996).
151. See id. at 485–88 (describing courthouse sales).
152. See id. at 473–74 (describing slave auctions as rituals that “reinforced the
subordinate position of slaves in Southern society”).
153. The cases were handed down as companion decisions and include The Slavers
(Kate), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 350 (1864); The Slavers (Sarah), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 366 (1864);
The Slavers (Weathergage), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 375 (1864); The Slavers (Reindeer), 69 U.S.
(2 Wall.) 383 (1864).  I will refer to these decisions collectively as the “Slave Trade Cases.”
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of the slave trade as a prohibited enterprise for most of the nineteenth
century often bore little relationship to the reality of a vigorous and per-
vasive clandestine trade.  For decades, efforts by federal officials to police
the trade were sporadic and half hearted, even as the ban on domestic
slavery in Northern states became an increasingly divisive issue.  A basic
understanding of these internal contradictions is an important prerequi-
site to appreciating the enforcement strategies that the Court ultimately
validated in the Slave Trade Cases.
For the first twenty years of the Republic, the regulation of the for-
eign slave trade rested entirely in the hands of the states.  Article I of the
Constitution empowered Congress to pass laws forbidding the trade, but
only following the year 1808.154  It was, of course, the Southern states that
insisted upon this compromise, using the threat of constitutional restric-
tions on federal laws relating to navigation to leverage the acquiescence
of the mercantile North during the Convention.155  It would be a mis-
take, however, to assume that the Southern states unqualifiedly favored
the further importation of African slaves.  Southern politicians wanted
control over the trade, but they were generally resistant to calls for an
unrestricted flood of human chattel.  One of the principal reasons for
this resistance was their desire to protect a certain form of social stability.
“Domestic” slaves—those born and raised on Southern plantations—were
acculturated to life in the colonies.  Perhaps more importantly, such na-
tive born slaves had never lived in freedom, unlike people stolen from the
coast of Africa.  They were a known quantity and easier to keep under
control; hence, they were safer and more valuable.  Many Southern
whites expressed apprehension at the thought of large numbers of rebel-
154. Section 9 of the Article states that:
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the
Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed
on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
155. See Du Bois, supra note 141, at 54–69.  Even at the time, the 1808 compromise R
was a cause of some embarrassment for representatives from the nonslave states,
prompting Madison to issue his unconvincing defense in Federalist 42:
It were doubtless to be wished that the power of prohibiting the importation
of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather that it had been
suffered to have immediate operation.  But it is not difficult to account either for
this restriction on the general government, or for the manner in which the whole
clause is expressed.  It ought to be considered as a great point gained in favor of
humanity that a period of twenty years may terminate forever, within these States,
a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern
policy; that within that period it will receive a considerable discouragement from
the federal government, and may be totally abolished, by a concurrence of a few
States which continue the unnatural traffic in the prohibitory example which has
been given by so great a majority of the Union.  Happy would it be for the
unfortunate Africans if an equal prospect lay before them of being redeemed
from the oppressions of their European brethren!
The Federalist No. 42, at 266 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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lious African “savages” flowing unrestricted to American shores, and they
insisted upon gradualism.156  Southern economic interests also favored
regulation of the slave trade to protect the value of existing, domestic
slave holdings that might be diminished by a glut of human capital on the
market.157
Thus, the legal slave trade continued during the twenty years follow-
ing the ratification of the Constitution, but on a regulated basis.  Only
three of the original slave-holding states officially imported slaves during
that time:  Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina.  Even of those,
both Georgia and North Carolina voluntarily banned the importation of
foreign slaves before the 1808 deadline arrived.158  The trade in South
Carolina, however, became concomitantly massive.  One contemporary
Congressional report recorded almost 40,000 slaves imported to Charles-
ton by foreign and domestic traders between 1804 and 1807, the last four
years of the legal trade.159  Coupled with the ongoing illicit traffic, these
numbers were enough to support a significant industry in human
importation.
Importantly, this industry was not confined to the slave states of the
South.  Northern merchants, shippers, and traders played a continuing
and vital role in the Southern slave trade.  Newport, Rhode Island, in
particular, was a major hub for the outfitting of ships engaged in the
trade.160  Of the 40,000 slaves imported into South Carolina from 1804 to
1807, about 8,000 were brought on Rhode Island vessels—four times the
number that were imported by merchants from Charleston itself.161  In-
deed, this lucrative trade was the principle source of revenue that ena-
bled Newport to grow into a jewel of affluence.162  To a lesser but still
156. Du Bois, supra note 141, at 57. R
157. A delegate to the Virginia ratifying convention, for example, lamented the
unwillingness of the Southern states to ban the further importation of Africans, in part for
fear that such importation would devalue the worth of Virginia holdings:  “As much as I
value a union of all the states, I would not admit the Southern States into the Union unless
they agree to the discontinuance of this disgraceful trade. . . . Yet they have not secured us
the property of the slaves we have already.”  Id. at 56 (quoting 3 Jonathan Elliot, The
Debates, Resolutions, and Other Proceedings in Convention, 452–53 (Washington, 1830));
see also id. at 56–69 (discussing economic motives of slaveholding states in restricting slave
trade).
158. North Carolina imposed a statutory ban upon the further importation of slaves
in 1794, and Georgia amended its Constitution to the same effect in 1798.  Id. at 71–72.
159. Id. at 90–91 & 90 n.5.
160. James A. Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade 359 (1981) (“By all accounts,
from contemporary eighteenth-century observers to twentieth-century historians, Rhode
Island was North America’s foremost slave trading area, with Newport at its center.”).
161. Du Bois, supra note 141, at 90–91 n.5; Rawley, supra note 160, at 379–80 R
(describing magnitude of Rhode Island trade from 1804–1807).
162. Du Bois, supra note 141, at 28; Rawley, supra note 160, at 363–84; Hugh Thomas, R
The Slave Trade:  The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade:  1440–1870, at 270–72 (1997).
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significant extent, merchants from Massachusetts to Maryland profited
handsomely from the trade.163
In the years leading up to 1808, Congress did enact laws that offi-
cially outlawed the slave trade, imposing a nationwide ban on both the
importation of slaves into the United States from abroad and the partici-
pation of American citizens in foreign slave trading activities.164  By this
time, however, the legal trade in South Carolina and the illicit trade in
other slave states had given rise to significant economic interests, in both
the North and the South, that were committed to continuing the profita-
ble traffic in African people.  Some voices—again, in both the North and
the South—condemned the slave trade with high-minded rhetoric, some
of it no doubt born of honest moral outrage, and promised to see that
the ban was enforced with vigor.165  But this rhetoric proved largely
empty.  For over forty years, federal efforts at enforcement were few and
ineffectual.166  During this period, the Office of the Treasury, which had
responsibility for enforcing the ban, was never given adequate funds for
its daunting task and did little to set up procedures or structures to re-
strict the trade.  In 1820, the Treasury Secretary himself reported to the
House of Representatives that “It appears, from an examination of the
records of this office, that no particular instructions have ever been given,
by the Secretary of the Treasury, under the original or supplementary
acts prohibiting the introduction of slaves into the United States.”167
Thirteen years after the imposition of the federal ban, with the illicit
trade continuing to flourish, there was no mechanism in place for enforc-
ing the law and few enforcement actions had been successfully
prosecuted.168
This lax federal enforcement was joined with widespread and active
subterfuge by the slave traders themselves.  On the high seas, traders de-
veloped an elaborate practice of changing the flags under which their
vessels sailed, fraudulently claiming allegiance to different sovereigns in
order to protect their ships from being boarded and searched or their
cargo seized.169  Where necessary, traders would launder their cargo of
slaves through markets where the trade remained legal—in the Carib-
bean, South America, and some European ports—so that the slaves could
then be brought to America in small, clandestine shipments.  This notori-
163. Du Bois, supra note 141, at 27–29; Rawley, supra note 160, at 385–418; Thomas, R
supra note 162, at 271–72, 283–84. R
164. Du Bois, supra note 141, at 94–96 (describing first federal law banning slave R
trade).
165. See, e.g., id. at 102–03 (discussing sentiments expressed by advocates of strict
enforcement of slave trade laws).
166. Id. at 109–16.
167. H.R. Rep. No. 21-348, at 77 (1830).
168. Du Bois, supra note 141, at 116–17. R
169. See, e.g., id. at 146–50 (recounting practices of slave trading vessels).
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ous “triangle trade” maintained an ever increasing flow of slaves from
Africa to America.170
Domestic participation in this trade was similarly widespread, and
took both direct and indirect forms.  Northern and Southern vessels alike
carried slaves between the ports of Africa or European slave trading na-
tions, the Caribbean, and the South.  Shipwrights in both regions learned
to specialize in the construction and outfitting of ships for these journeys,
while provisioners prepared low quality foodstuffs that could be loaded
onto these ships in large quantities.171  Such items enabled slave traders
to transport massive numbers of kidnapped Africans under extreme con-
ditions while keeping expenses and death rates at profitable levels.172
The assistance of such domestic supporting institutions was vital to the
continuation of the trade, and the laxity of federal enforcement made
that assistance readily available.  This state of affairs continued, largely
unimproved, through the middle of the century.  One New York periodi-
cal wrote in 1857:
Few of our readers are aware . . . of the extent to which this
infernal traffic is carried on, by vessels clearing from New York,
and in close alliance with our legitimate trade; and that down-
town merchants of wealth and respectability are extensively en-
gaged in buying and selling African Negroes, and have been,
with comparatively little interruption, for an indefinite number
of years.173
As late as the 1850s, both on the high seas and domestically, the nation-
wide ban on the slave trade was honored almost entirely in the breach.
It was only in the period leading up to and following the outbreak of
the Civil War that the federal government began serious efforts to en-
force the ban on slave trading.  The efforts coincided with the increasing
polarization of regional interests.  Southern slaveholding states began agi-
tating in the 1850s for the formal reopening of the trade, arguing that
the ban on importation constituted an assault on the domestic institution
of slavery and threatened their economy.174  Professor Du Bois explains:
170. Thomas, supra note 162, at 568–73. R
171. Rawley, supra note 160, at 254–57, 290–98.  Slavers sometimes smoked their R
ships with pitch, for example, in hopes of slowing the spread of smallpox, and the major
slave traders developed specialized medical manuals for the care of slave cargoes.  Id. at
291–92, 294–95.  They also prepared basic, low quality staples to feed to stolen Africans
during the months-long middle passage across the Atlantic.  The Slavers (Reindeer), 69
U.S. (2 Wall.) 383, 396–99 (1864); Rawley, supra note 160, at 297–98; see also Thomas, R
supra note 162, at 304–06 (describing implements of European slave traders). R
172. See Rawley, supra note 160, at 283–90 (discussing mortality rates in Atlantic R
crossing and relationship to profitability of trade).
173. Am. Anti-Slavery Soc’y, 24th Ann. Rep. 56 (1859) (quoting N.Y. J. Com. (1857)).
174. As Professors Foner and Mahoney write, advocates for the reopening of the trade
hoped “that an influx of new slaves would increase the number of whites with a vested
interest in the institution and lay the groundwork for slavery’s expansion southward.”  Eric
Foner & Olivia Mahoney, A House Divided:  America in the Age of Lincoln 68 (1990); see
\\Server03\productn\C\COL\102-4\COL403.txt unknown Seq: 43  7-MAY-02 17:50
2002] THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND GLOBAL SLAVERY 1015
When, after 1850, the price of slaves had risen to a monopoly
height, the leaders of the plantation system, brought to the edge
of bankruptcy by the crude and reckless farming necessary
under a slave régime, and baffled, at least temporarily, in their
quest of new rich land to exploit, began instinctively to feel that
the only salvation of American slavery lay in the reopening of
the African slave-trade.175
This radical advocacy produced severe political stresses, both domes-
tically and abroad,176 and finally provoked a response from the federal
government.  In 1859 and 1860, President Buchanan obtained the first
substantial appropriations dedicated to enforcement of the ban and
placed the weight of his administration behind interdiction efforts.177
Abraham Lincoln intensified these efforts and, in 1862, his administra-
tion obtained a sentence of death against a convicted slave trader in fed-
eral district court, the first capital sentence ever obtained for such a con-
viction.178  With the open declaration of hostilities between the North
and the South, the Union demonstrated a new dedication to ending
American participation in the slave trade, both domestically and abroad.
It was in this legal and political atmosphere that the Supreme Court
decided the Slave Trade Cases.  The cases grew out of the federal govern-
ment’s newly vigorous enforcement policy and called upon the Court to
define the permissible bounds of such enforcement under existing fed-
eral statutes.  Decision of this issue, in turn, required the Court to con-
sider the relationship between the actual carrying on of the slave trade
itself (through the use of foreign ports) and those supporting institutions
that operated domestically to facilitate this trade.
The Slave Trade Cases arose out of seizure and forfeiture proceed-
ings initiated by federal authorities against four ships—the Reindeer, the
Kate, the Sarah, and the Weathergage—in U.S. ports of call.  The complaint
against each ship was that it had been designed and outfitted by its Amer-
ican owner to be used by others in the traffic of human cargo, in violation
of the acts of Congress prohibiting American participation in the slave
trade.179  In none of the cases did federal authorities allege that the ships
were used to import slaves into the United States.  These were cases in-
volving a traffic in slaves carried on exclusively between foreign ports, as
the Court explained in The Reindeer:
[T]he material charges . . . [include] the following:
1.  That the vessel was . . . fitted, equipped, and prepared
within the port of New York, for the purpose of carrying on
also Du Bois, supra note 141, at 168–78 (describing movement to abolish laws prohibiting R
slave trade).
175. Du Bois, supra note 141, at 169. R
176. Id. at 146–50.
177. Id. at 187.
178. Id. at 191.
179. See, e.g., The Slavers (Kate), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 350, 363–65 (1864) (describing
evidence supporting allegation of participation in slave trade).
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trade or traffic in slaves to some foreign country, or for the pur-
pose of procuring from some foreign kingdom, place or coun-
try, the inhabitants thereof to be transported to some foreign
country, port or place, to be sold and disposed of as slaves.180
Nor did federal authorities allege that the American owners of the
ships were themselves slave traders.  The offense that merited seizure of
these vessels was, as the Court wrote in The Reindeer, that the ships had
been “fitted, equipped, and prepared . . . for the purpose of carrying on
[foreign] trade or traffic in slaves”—in other words, that U.S. in-
termediaries had taken steps to facilitate a foreign trade in slaves by pro-
viding some of the implements best suited to that practice.
There was no question in the mind of the Court that intentional
participation by U.S. citizens in a purely foreign slave trade violated the
proscriptions laid down by Congress, nor that those proscriptions were
legitimate exercises of Congressional power.181  Federal law had provided
for decades that American citizens were prohibited from participating,
either directly or indirectly, in the foreign slave trade.182  As the Court
had put it in United States v. Morris, one of the earlier slave trade prosecu-
tions, “The whole scope of the enactments of congress shows their inten-
tion to punish every American citizen who engages in the slave-trade.”183
Elaborating in The Sarah, the Court stated that:
Undoubtedly, the statutory offence is completed when the prep-
arations for the voyage have reached a stage which shows satis-
factorily that the purpose of the fitting and equipment was [to
facilitate foreign slave trade].  Plainly, the object of the law is to
prevent the preparation of vessels in our ports for that trade
. . . .184
Similar criminal sanctions for the participation of U.S. citizens in any
foreign slave trade continue to exist in the U.S. Code.185  Uncontested or
180. The Slavers (Reindeer), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 383, 393 (1864).
181. See, e.g., The Slavers (Kate), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) at 363 (“There is no question of
the construction of the acts of Congress, prohibiting the slave-trade, or of the forfeiture, if
the allegations of the libel were established by proof.”).
182. Thomas, supra note 162, at 568–69 (discussing period of official prohibition). R
There were at least some prosecutions for such participation during this period of
prohibition.  In United States v. Morris, for example, the Court affirmed a conviction,
writing:
No citizen can fit out or equip a vessel for the slave-trade, either in any part of the
United States, or in any other place, to sail from the United States; nor can he
hold any property, directly or indirectly, in a vessel engaged in transporting slaves
between two foreign countries; nor can a vessel sail from the United States to
engage in such traffic; and if she clears out for the coast of Africa, security against
her engaging in such traffic may be required, and must be given.
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 464, 467 (1840).
183. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 467.
184. The Slavers (Sarah), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 366, 370–71 (1864).
185. The contemporary proscriptions, contained in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, target
the full range of participation by U.S. citizens in any foreign slave trade.  Section 1582
forbids the outfitting of ships for use in the slave trade:
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not, however, it is important not to miss the significance of the basic as-
sumption at work in these cases:  The indirect facilitation of a purely for-
eign slave trade by a U.S. citizen through the provision of ships and other
equipment is inherently objectionable because it locates a component of
that foreign slave trade within domestic borders.  That basic assumption,
retained in the contemporary federal statutes that prohibit the slave
trade, demonstrates a recognition of the interrelation between the insti-
tution of slavery and the other institutions that were necessary to perpetu-
ate and support it—a recognition, indeed, that was shared by contempo-
rary defenders of the foreign slave trade, who viewed the trade (and its
domestic support structures) as vital to the continued viability of slavery
in the South.186
To appreciate the significance of that analytical conceit, consider, by
way of comparison, the recent attempts in American courts to hold gun
manufacturers responsible in tort for the costs resulting from gun-related
violence.  Modern courts have been quite reluctant to entertain claims
that gun manufacturers bear liability for the ultimate criminal use of
their products, even though it is commonly understood that their prod-
ucts are widely used in criminal activity, and even though some of the
guns that they manufacture are reasonably suited only to criminal pur-
poses—like, for example, the “fingerprint resistant” weapons that gave
Whoever, whether as master, factor, or owner, builds, fits out, equips, loads,
or otherwise prepares or sends away any vessel, in any port or place within the
United States, or causes such vessel to sail from any such port or place, for the
purpose of procuring any person from any foreign kingdom or country to be
transported and held, sold, or otherwise disposed of as a slave, or held to service
or labor, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than seven years,
or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1582 (1994).  Section 1585 prohibits the sale of slaves in foreign slave trade:
Whoever, being a citizen or resident of the United States and a member of
the crew or ship’s company of any foreign vessel engaged in the slave trade, or
whoever, being of the crew or ship’s company of any vessel owned in whole or in
part, or navigated for, or in behalf of, any citizen of the United States, lands from
such vessel, and on any foreign shore seizes any person with intent to make that
person a slave, or decoys, or forcibly brings, carries, receives, confines, detains or
transports any person as a slave on board such vessel, or, on board such vessel,
offers or attempts to sell any such person as a slave, or on the high seas or
anywhere on tide water, transfers or delivers to any other vessel any such person
with intent to make such person a slave, or lands or delivers on shore from such
vessel any person with intent to sell, or having previously sold, such person as a
slave, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than seven years, or
both.
Id. § 1585.  And section 1586 outlaws voluntary participation in foreign slave trade as a
member of a ship’s crew:
Whoever, being a citizen or resident of the United States, voluntarily serves
on board of any vessel employed or made use of in the transportation of slaves
from any foreign country or place to another, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id. § 1586.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 174–176. R
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rise to an unsuccessful suit in California.187  Where a manufacturer has
created a firearm with both legitimate and illegitimate uses, these courts
have declined to hold the manufacturer responsible for a purchaser’s in-
dependent intervening decision to use the gun for illegitimate ends.  The
defendants in the Slave Trade Cases essentially raised the same defense,
arguing that their products—ships, provisions—had many legitimate uses
and that they should not be penalized for selling those products in legiti-
mate business transactions.  In rejecting these arguments, the Court ex-
plicitly marked its recognition of the need for invasive enforcement strat-
egies in the context of the slave trade.
The doctrinal dispute in the Slave Trade Cases centered around the
question of evidence.  At issue was the level of participation in the foreign
slave trade (and evidence thereof) that was necessary to support the dras-
tic remedy of seizure and forfeiture of a valuable vessel and cargo.  The
pre-War industrialists who supplied foreign slave traders were an inge-
nious lot.  These ship builders and outfitters strove to maintain plausible
deniability in their commerce, always selling vessels and goods that were
suited to legitimate as well as illicit purposes.  The argument of the Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney General in one of the Slave Trade Cases gives some
sense (albeit a tendentious one) of the resulting evidentiary obstacles
faced by federal authorities in attempting to prevent American participa-
tion in this illegal industry:
The [slave] trade, however amenable in reality to the law, is now
carried on with a regular machinery to evade law.  This is a pre-
requisite of the trade; an invariable part of it; a machinery which
requires lies, fraud, and perjury at the bottom of everything; a
machinery of agents and foreigners, regularly prearranged in
anticipation of discovery; having no reality for any purpose, and
no design but to circumvent justice.
. . . .
In cases of guilt, the following are standing indicia:
. . . .
5. A cargo scrupulously proper for the lawful trade; but
with this characteristic of it, that every item of it is equally appli-
cable to the slave-trade, and can easily and instantly be so con-
verted and applied.188
At stake in the Slave Trade Cases was the ability of federal authorities
to enforce prohibitions on domestic facilitation of the foreign slave trade
despite this plausible deniability.  Though the ships and cargo supplied to
187. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 119 (Cal. 2001) (construing statute to deny
cause of action against gun manufacturer for product liability based on criminal use of
gun, even though gun was specially designed to be “fingerprint resistant” and was
otherwise suited for criminal uses); see also Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 75 N.E.2d
1055, 1059 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that gun manufacturers owe members of public no duty
of reasonable care in marketing and distribution of handguns); id. at 1064–65 n.6
(collecting federal and state cases reaching same result).
188. The Slavers (Kate), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 350, 360–61 (1864).
\\Server03\productn\C\COL\102-4\COL403.txt unknown Seq: 47  7-MAY-02 17:50
2002] THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND GLOBAL SLAVERY 1019
the slave trade by American industrialists were susceptible of legitimate
uses, they exhibited a profile that federal authorities believed that they
could identify with confidence and rely upon to initiate forfeiture pro-
ceedings. The Reindeer includes a particularly detailed description of such
a profile:
Counsel of the United States contend that the vessel was
evidently fitted, equipped, and otherwise prepared and caused
to sail from the port of New York to Havana, with the ultimate
purpose that she should proceed to the west coast of Africa to
engage in the slave trade. . . .
. . . They shipped part of the cargo, and the manifest shows
that their shipment included one box and twenty-two packages
of hardware, and fourteen thousand seven hundred pounds of
tasajo, or dried beef, which it is proved comes from Buenos Ay-
res, and is not an article of shipment from New York to Havana,
but is an article imported into Cuba from South America, and is
largely used for feeding negroes.
. . . .
. . . [T]he list of the cargo taken from the vessel, shows that
a large quantity of articles, specially suited to the slave trade,
were not on the manifest . . . .
Articles not on the manifest embrace sixty-five water-pipes,
casks of high-colored paint, pickled fish, coarse salt, two barrels
of lime, four jars of chloride of lime, cases of medicines, medici-
nal herbs and lint, coarse sponges, and one demijohn of disin-
fecting fluid. . . .
All of these articles are proved to be used in the slave trade
. . . .189
Federal authorities sought the ability to obtain orders of forfeiture
against owners and suppliers on the basis of such evidence, despite the
ever available argument that the industrialists were selling legal goods
that could also be put to legitimate use.
The Court granted federal authorities the evidentiary presumption
that they sought, ruling in each of the Slave Trade Cases that the circum-
stances surrounding these putatively legitimate ships and cargoes sufficed
to render them subject to forfeiture.190  This was an aggressive presump-
tion.  In each case, the principal evidence supporting the conclusion that
the shipbuilders intended these vessels and cargo to be used in the slave
trade (rather than simply knowing or suspecting that they might be) was
189. The Slavers (Reindeer), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 383, 396–98 (1864).
190. The Court stated the evidentiary rule most concisely in The Reindeer:
Experience shows that positive proof in such cases is not generally to be expected,
and for that reason among others the law allows a resort to circumstances as the
means of ascertaining the truth. Circumstances altogether inconclusive, if
separately considered, may, by their number and joint operation, especially when
corroborated by moral coincidences, be sufficient to constitute conclusive proof.
Id. at 401.
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the suitability of the goods to that ultimate purpose.191  To be sure, there
was circumstantial evidence to support that conclusion.  As discussed
above, the role of merchants and shipwrights in supporting the foreign
slave trade was well known.  But the leap from such circumstantial evi-
dence to a finding that a particular merchant sought to aid and promote
the slave trade was a substantial one.
In the lead case in this series, the Court explicitly justified its aggres-
sive evidentiary presumption with reference to the particular evils of the
slave trade—evils whose eradication, the Court concluded, could prop-
erly require extra sacrifice on the part of international business concerns:
In considering this evidence, it is to be borne in mind, that
for more than three hundred years the western coast of Africa
has been scourged by the atrocities of the slave-trade; and that
this inhuman traffic, although at length proscribed and pursued
with severe penalties by nearly all Christian nations, has contin-
ued, with almost unabated activity and ferocity, even to our
times. . . . It does not seem unreasonable, since it is the para-
mount interest of humanity that the traffic in men be, at all
events, arrested, to require of the trader, who engages in a com-
merce, which, although not unlawful, is necessarily suspicious
from its theatre and circumstances, that he keep his operations
so clear and so distinct in their character, as to repel the imputa-
tion of prohibited purpose.192
Thus, in authorizing federal authorities to target shippers and outfit-
ters directly, the Court recognized the role that such supporting institu-
tions had played in enabling the slave trade to continue and thrive in the
face of official condemnation.  The disfavored status accorded to the
slave trade, the Court concluded, justified extraordinary enforcement
mechanisms against those supporting institutions.
This practical experience with the slave trade contributes another
element to the multilayered practice of “slavery” that the Thirteenth
Amendment must be understood to have eradicated.  In the Slave Trade
Cases, the Court considered how the slave trade operates on an institu-
tional level—what practices enable the trade to occur and what remedies
are necessary to ensure that it “not exist” within a free jurisdiction.  The
Court concluded that these supporting institutions, in feeding the slave
trade and enabling it to function, formed an inextricable and culpable
component of the larger practice.  It reached these conclusions despite
191. See, e.g., The Slavers (Kate), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) at 366 (finding guilt based on “the
destination of the voyage, the character of the vessel and cargo, and the character and acts
of the parties”); The Slavers (Sarah), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 366, 374 (1864) (“Considered as a
whole, the various circumstances to which reference has been made afford very strong
ground of presumption that the allegations of the libel of information are true.”); The
Slavers (Weathergage), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 375, 380 (1864) (“Undoubtedly, it is the
preparation of the vessel, and the purpose for which she is to be employed, that constitute
the offence, and draw after it the penalty of forfeiture.”).
192. The Slavers (Kate), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) at 363–64.
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the decades during which the federal government permitted the ban to
languish unenforced, and despite the significant disruption that this
newly aggressive enforcement would work upon domestic financial inter-
ests.  Any modern analysis of the exploitation of slave labor across na-
tional borders must be informed by this experience.
3. Slavery as Industrial Market Force. — The third lens through which I
propose to analyze the practice of slavery is the industrial.  Where the
interpersonal lens focuses attention upon the social relation between
master and slave, and the institutional lens scrutinizes the practical opera-
tion of a system of slavery, the industrial lens looks to the larger economic
forces that give rise to the exploitation of forced labor.  In both the justifi-
cations offered for slavery by its pre-Civil War defenders and the Supreme
Court’s subsequent elaborations of the Thirteenth Amendment’s man-
date, there exists a pervasive recognition that certain industries lend
themselves to the exploitation of forced labor and, indeed, create inten-
tional markets for slavery.  That recognition forms the basis of my third
proposition:
Proposition 3: The Thirteenth Amendment is highly sensitive to the
intentional creation of industrial markets for slave labor.
The inhabitants of pre-Civil War America did not understand slave
labor to be merely one among many fungible labor options—like differ-
ent levels of employee training or a forty-five hour work week—that an
industry might consider adopting in seeking to maximize its profitability.
One of the basic justifications for American slave practices was the notion
that certain industries were particularly suited to, and largely dependent
upon, the contributions of African slaves.  Foremost among these, of
course, was the plantation farm industry.  As cash-crop operations, these
farms required backbreaking work under extreme conditions of tempera-
ture and climate and, at the same time, were inherently seasonal, leaving
workers with no gainful work for significant portions of the year.  Cash-
crop plantation farms thus required a workforce of manual laborers who
were resilient and industrious (or easily replaceable) and yet would re-
main tied to the land during the off season.  This combination of circum-
stances rendered slave labor a seductive option.
At the same time, another, complementary notion also permeated
the American experience with slavery:  the belief that certain industries,
in exploiting slave labor, were responding to natural qualities inherent in
the enslaved individuals themselves.  A special set of justifications for
American slavery, deeply inflected with racism, served to explain and re-
inforce this notion.  For example, the defenders of slavery frequently ar-
gued that the indigenous peoples of Africa were biologically suited to
hard labor in extreme climates, while people of European descent lacked
the physical capacity to work effectively under such conditions.  Justifica-
tions like these offered additional support for the assertion that it was the
particular requirements of the industry that both fueled and responded to
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the market for slave labor, and not merely the unwillingness of industrial-
ists to consider other options.
There is no shortage of examples of “scientific” pronouncements on
the natural suitability of Africans to the condition of slavery.  A typical
one comes to us from T.R.R. Cobb, author of an influential nineteenth-
century study of the Southern law of slavery.193  As a corollary to his study
of legal doctrines, Cobb concluded that Africans were “natural slaves,”
writing:
This inquiry into the physical, mental, and moral develop-
ment of the negro race, seems to point them clearly, as pecu-
liarly fitted for a laborious class.  Their physical frame is capable
of great and long-continued exertion.  Their mental capacity
renders them incapable of successful self-development, and yet
adapts them for the direction of a wiser race.  Their moral char-
acter renders them happy, peaceful, contented, and cheerful in
a status that would break the spirit and destroy the energies of
the Caucasian or the native American.194
Such sentiments were regularly deployed to justify the morality of
keeping people of African descent in bondage.195  But they were also
used to demonstrate the industrial necessity of that practice—a closely
related, but importantly distinct purpose.  As defenders of slavery saw it,
the “natural suitability” of Africans for the condition of slavery also ren-
dered them an indispensable part of cash-crop plantation farming.  If
slaves did not do the work, so the argument went, then no one would,
and these industries would either cease to function or operate at much
lower levels of profit.  That being so, the industries themselves created
the inexorable demand for slave labor.
Consider in this light the following excerpt from a widely circulated
eighteenth-century pamphlet, written by an anonymous English planter
in response to Lord Mansfield’s ruling in the Somerset case.  The author
was deeply critical of Somerset, claiming that it would injure the interests
of English and American planters, and one of his tasks in this pamphlet
was to argue that slavery, though unfortunate, remained a necessary part
of agricultural industry:
193. See Paul Finkelman, Thomas R.R. Cobb and the Law of Negro Slavery, 5 Roger
Williams U. L. Rev. 75, 100–01, 108–11 (1999) (discussing influence of Cobb’s treatise in
contemporary discussions of slavery); Tushnet, supra note 97, at 82 (discussing influence R
of Cobb’s treatise among jurists).
194. Thomas R.R. Cobb, An Inquiry Into the Law of Negro Slavery 46–47 (1858); see
also Thomas D. Morris, Southern Slavery and the Law 1619–1860, at 18 (1996) (discussing
this passage).
195. Professor Foner describes this belief system in the following terms:
Belief in black inferiority formed a central tenet of the southern defense of
slavery, and in the North too, many who were undecided on the merits of the
peculiar institution, and even those who disapproved of it, believed that the
Negro was by nature destined to occupy a subordinate position in society.
Eric Foner, Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War 77 (1980).
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The nature of the West India climate, and the impossibility
of clearing and cultivating the soil there, by any other than
Negroe labourers, as it was first the occasion of employing them,
so it must ever remain, as long as our colonies exist; because,
this natural necessity is not to be cured by any alternative.  Some
writers have affirmed, that the sugar islands were first cultivated
by white men, who shewed no unfitness for labour there, before
Negroe-slaves were introduced; but these authors deal in rever-
ies, and seem entirely ignorant both of the subject and the cli-
mate they treat upon.
. . . .
Slave-holding might perhaps be very well discontinued in
every province of the North American continent, situated to the
North of the Carolinas. . . . But in the southern continental prov-
ince, and in the sugar islands, this practice cannot be laid aside,
so long as we persist in the cultivation of them, for the purposes
of trade; because, it is impossible to cultivate them with Euro-
pean labourers; and because, the white inhabitants, I presume,
can never increase there by propagation in sufficient
numbers.196
These passages rely upon the same assumptions of racial essentialism
that Cobb would reiterate nearly a century later.  But here they are
deployed, not to justify the continued enslavement of Africans on moral
grounds, but to explain the industrial necessity of keeping Africans in
bondage.197  Such justifications may not have obtained in all commercial
settings where slaves came to be employed in America, but they unques-
tionably constituted one of the dominant narratives of the American slave
experience.
Professor Eric Williams, in his landmark study of the economic ori-
gins of slavery in the New World, supplements these contemporaneous
industrial justifications with an extensive analysis of the demand for labor
that the American agricultural economy created.  Williams forcefully as-
serts that plantation farming did not merely create a market for slavery.
Given the shortage of European workers, he concludes, the rise of this
new, labor intensive industry rendered slavery all but inevitable:
When slavery is adopted, it is not adopted as the choice over free
labor; there is no choice at all.  The reasons for slavery, wrote
Gibbon Wakefield, “are not moral, but economical circum-
stances; they relate not to vice and virtue, but to production.”
With the limited population of Europe in the sixteenth century,
the free laborers necessary to cultivate the staple crops of sugar,
196. Edward Long, Candid Reflections Upon the Judgement Lately Awarded by The
Court of King’s Bench, in Westminster-Hall, On What is Commonly Called the Negroe-
Cause 13–14, 18 (1772), reprinted in Slavery and Race, supra note 112, at 83, 99–100, 104. R
197. Professor Eric Williams challenges these contemporary, racially inflected
explanations for the industrial necessity of slavery, arguing that race was, at best, a post hoc
rationalization for what was a simple matter of economics.  See infra notes 198–199 and R
accompanying text.
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tobacco and cotton in the New World could not have been sup-
plied in quantities adequate to permit large-scale production.
Slavery was necessary for this . . . .198
Obviously enough, the moral subtext underlying Williams’s discus-
sion of the industrial “necessity” of slavery in the New World differs
greatly from that of an eighteenth-century apologist.199  But the basic ob-
servation remains largely the same and is a pervasive one in scholarly dis-
cussions of the economics of slavery.200  Deeply embedded in both pre-
Civil War conceptions of slavery and in subsequent scholarly analyses was
the understanding that the particular economies of the New World had
created industrial markets for slave labor.201
198. Eric Williams, Capitalism & Slavery 6 (2d ed. 1994) (quoting Edward Gibbon
Wakefield, A View of the Art of Colonization 323 (London, J.W. Parker 1849)).
199. Of necessity, I am glossing over much complexity here.  As Williams explains at
length, the European expansion into the New World gave rise to a tension among 1)
scholarly tenets (most notably those of Adam Smith) that largely rejected slavery as an
economically attractive option, 2) the reality of labor shortages and the resulting
exploitation of slave labor, and 3) disingenuous attempts to justify that reality in terms of
natural racial hierarchy rather than economic self-interest.  Williams, supra note 198, at R
3–9.  But determining the proper resolution to that tension is not germane for present
purposes, for it is a tension over explaining a generally accepted fact—the driving force of
industrial necessity in creating markets for slave labor.
200. See, for example, Du Bois in his treatise on the slave trade:
The planting colonies are those Southern settlements whose climate and
character destined them to be the chief theatre of North American slavery. . . .
Theirs was the only soil, climate, and society suited to slavery; in the other
colonies, with few exceptions, the institution was by these same factors doomed
from the beginning.  Hence, only strong moral and political motives could in the
planting colonies overthrow or check a traffic so favored by the mother country.
Du Bois, supra note 141, at 7. R
201. It should be noted that the economic rationality of slave labor, particularly in the
Deep South, was much debated in the nineteenth century and remains much debated
today.  See, e.g., Robert William Fogel & Stanley L. Engerman, Time on the Cross 4–6
(1974) (describing debate between received view of slavery’s economic irrationality and
more recent scholarship criticizing that view).  While industries like plantation cash-crop
farming created the demand for slave labor, it is far from clear that the satisfaction of that
demand redounded to the ultimate economic benefit of the owners.  An opinion of the
Virginia Court of Appeals, rejecting a claim for unpaid wages by slaves who successfully
sued for their freedom, captures the tenor of the debate:
The arrangements, management and expenditures of slave owners are, in a great
measure, essentially different from those of persons who employ free labour in
their occupations and service.  The latter are, for the most part, in the habit of
engaging individuals, from time to time, as the occasion may seem to require, and
of dismissing them when found unsuitable or unnecessary; and are in no wise
bound to provide gratuitously for their wants and comforts, or the maintenance
of their families.  The owner of slaves, on the contrary, is usually condemned to a
constant, permanent and anxious burthen of care and expenditure.  It seldom
happens that more than a small proportion of them are capable of productive
labor; while provision must be made for the food, clothing and shelter of all; for
the helplessness of infancy, the decrepitude of age, the infirmities of disease; to
say nothing of the heedlessness, slothfulness and waste natural to persons in their
condition.  Hence it is that the scantiness of net profit from slave labour has
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One of the post-Civil War peonage cases discussed earlier,202 Pollock
v. Williams,203 illustrates the extent to which this understanding has con-
tinued to inform the Court’s engagement with slavery claims under the
Thirteenth Amendment. Pollock was the last in the series of opinions,
beginning with Clyatt v. United States204 and Bailey v. Alabama,205 in which
the Court took progressively tougher positions on the practice of peon-
age in America.  The early peonage opinions—ruling, as they did, on stat-
utes that were largely unabashed in their support of peonage arrange-
ments—offered possible grounds for distinguishing later, more sanitized
tactics, and some states repeatedly amended their statutes in an attempt
to find a peonage scheme that would pass muster.206  In Pollock, the Court
issued what it clearly intended to be (and in fact was) its final statement
on the subject of peonage, putting to rest further attempts at formal
circumvention.207
The Pollock Court set forth the broad and unequivocal holding that
“no state can make the quitting of work any component of a crime, or
make criminal sanctions available for holding unwilling persons to la-
bor.”208  In so doing, it discussed the practice of peonage in a manner
that revealed a continuing sensitivity to the potential for particular indus-
tries to embrace slave practices, citing approvingly and quoting at length
become proverbial, and that nothing is more common than an actual loss, or a
benefit merely in the slow increase of capital from propagation.
Peter v. Hargrave, 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 12, 19 (1848); see also Tushnet, supra note 97, at 22–23 R
(discussing Hargrave).
202. See supra note 50. R
203. 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
204. 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
205. 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
206. See Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 216 (holding that Thirteenth Amendment prohibits
peonage arrangements); Bailey, 219 U.S. at 238–39 (extending Clyatt to “antifraud” statutes
where black workers, who were not allowed to testify, were convicted based on statutory
“presumptions”); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29–31 (1942) (extending Bailey to
situations where accused workers are allowed to make unsworn statements in their
defense); Pollock, 322 U.S. at 22–25 (extending Bailey to situations where accused workers
are allowed to offer sworn testimony in their defense); id. at 15–17 (detailing attempts by
Florida to reenact peonage schemes in response to successful Thirteenth Amendment
challenges).
207. The Court did not mince words.  Consider, for example, this rather blunt
preface to the section of the Court’s opinion addressing the purposes underlying the
Thirteenth Amendment and their application to the practice of peonage:  “We are
induced by the evident misunderstanding of our decisions by the Florida Supreme Court,
in what we are convinced was a conscientious and painstaking study of them, to make more
explicit the basis of constitutional invalidity of this type of statute.” Pollock, 322 U.S. at 17.
208. Id. at 18.  As in most of the peonage cases, the petitioner in Pollock made claims
under both the Thirteenth Amendment itself and the federal antipeonage provisions that
implement the Amendment, and the Court’s discussion of the two is largely
interchangeable.  See, e.g., id. at 17–18 (“The undoubted aim of the Thirteenth
Amendment as implemented by the Antipeonage Act was not merely to end slavery but to
maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor.”).
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from a congressional report on the subject.  Speaking first to the inci-
dence of peonage as a general matter, the Court wrote:
Where peonage has existed in the United States it has done so
chiefly by virtue of laws like the [antifraud] statute in question.
. . . In 1910, in response to a resolution of the House of Repre-
sentatives, the Immigration Commission reported the results of
an investigation of peonage among immigrants in the United
States.  It found that no general system of peonage existed, and
that sentiment did not support it anywhere.  On the other hand,
it found sporadic cases of probable peonage in every state in the
Union except Oklahoma and Connecticut.209
These “sporadic cases” usually centered around industries that were
dependent upon an immigrant workforce, as the Court explained in dis-
cussing one of the most extreme examples documented in the congres-
sional report:
[The report] pointed out that “there has probably existed in
Maine the most complete system of peonage in the entire coun-
try,” in the lumber camps. . . . “In late years the natives who
formerly supplied the labor for the logging concerns in that
State have been engaged in the paper mills, and the lumber
companies have been compelled to import laborers, largely for-
eigners, from other States.  Boston is the chief labor market for
the Maine forests.  The employment agents misrepresent condi-
tions in the woods . . . . The men will then be kept in the heart
of the forest for months throughout the winter, living in a most
rugged fashion and with no recreation whatever.”210
The report continues, explaining how quickly and thoroughly this system
of involuntary servitude became intertwined with the lumber industry in
the region:
Involuntary servitude results in utilizing this statute to in-
timidate laborers to work against their will.  On account of the
vigorous methods pursued in enforcing the above-described law,
it soon became known throughout the lumber region of Maine
that any laborer was liable to imprisonment who refused to work
according to the provisions of his contract until he had settled
for all advances, no matter what misrepresentations may have
been made to induce him to enter into the agreement.  The
contract-labor law has become a club which the foremen and
superintendents draw upon the laborers who refuse to go to
work or to continue at work.  If a man leaves his employer
before settling for advances, he will be pursued and appre-
hended, or someone will telephone to the constable, who will
arrest the laborer.  He will then be brought before the justice,
and “sent down the river,” to prison; or if he consents to labor
209. Id. at 18.
210. Id. at 18–19 & 19 n.30 (quoting 2 Report on Peonage, Abstracts of Reports of the
Immigration Comm’n 447, Sen. Doc. No. 747, 61st Cong., 3d Sess.) [hereinafter Report on
Peonage].
\\Server03\productn\C\COL\102-4\COL403.txt unknown Seq: 55  7-MAY-02 17:50
2002] THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND GLOBAL SLAVERY 1027
until he shall have reimbursed for all advances and the fine and
cost of the prosecution, the employer will settle with the court
and constable and will take the laborer back into the forest.211
The actual dispute in Pollock did not concern peonage in Maine at
all; strictly speaking, the Court’s extended discussion of the Maine lum-
ber industry was unnecessary to its holding.212  Rather, the Court’s appar-
ent purpose in describing the Maine situation at such length was to offer
an exemplar of the system of peonage that it meant finally to eradicate
with its broadly written opinion.  Its choice of subject is revealing.  The
characteristics of the peonage system in the Maine lumber industry bore
some disturbing similarities to the slavery that existed on Southern cash-
crop plantations:  a racially defined, captive workforce, tied by economic
vulnerability and physical coercion to an industrial harvesting business,
and kept on the job through the active cooperation of legal authorities.
Certainly, the congressional report’s reference to laborers being “sold
down the river” to prison when they attempted to leave their jobs was
intended to evoke this parallel.  As Professor Jones makes clear, the pat-
tern identified by the Court in Pollock was pervasive.  Jones has docu-
mented instances of peonage around the South at the turn of the cen-
tury.213  Most operated much like the abuses in the Maine lumber
industry:
The more remote a camp, the bleaker the existence of the
people who lived in it, the more desperate their desire to leave,
and the more difficult their escape from its confines.  Time and
again federal authorities investigating peonage cases cited the
inaccessibility of the work site as a major element in both hiding
abuses and preventing their eradication.214
Having set forth its practical understanding of the capacity of certain
industries to generate a demand for forced labor, the Pollock Court goes
on to tie that understanding to some of America’s earliest insights about
the cascading impacts of slavery.  In a deep recapitulation of the treat-
ment of the slave arrangement as a pernicious social relation, so pervasive
in pre-War slavery jurisprudence, the Court explains that slave exploita-
tion by one employer can also have a pernicious impact upon free labor
within an entire industry:
When the master can compel and the laborer cannot es-
cape the obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress
and no incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or un-
211. Id. at 20–21 n.32 (quoting Report on Peonage, supra note 210, at 448–49). R
212. The actual holding of Pollock simply extended the proscription against
“antifraud” peonage statutes to include cases (like the one under the Florida prosecution
before it) where accused workers were allowed to offer sworn testimony in their own
defense.  Id. at 25.
213. Jones, supra note 32, at 73–166. R
214. Id. at 153; see also id. at 128 (discussing peonage in Florida phosphate industry);
id. at 152 (discussing peonage in turpentine industry); Goluboff, supra note 21, at 1657–58 R
(describing exploitation of forced labor in Florida).
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wholesome conditions of work.  Resulting depression of working
conditions and living standards affects not only the laborer
under the system, but every other with whom his labor comes in
competition.215
Here we see the hard fought lesson of the American experience with slav-
ery as a social relation projected onto a broader screen.  As the social
relation of slavery endangers the morals of the master, inspiring in him
“the most boisterous passions, the most unremitting despotism,”216 so the
resulting “depression of working conditions and living standards” in the
laborer “affects . . . every other with whom his labor comes in competi-
tion.”  Indeed, these insights echo the expressions of concern issued by
members of Congress during the ratifying debates for the Thirteenth
Amendment that the presence of slavery in an industry “degrades labor”
and harms the lot of free workers.217 Pollock thus completes the transla-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment, begun in Clyatt and Bailey, that was
necessary to accommodate the changing forms of labor exploitation in
the first half of the twentieth century.218
This was not the first time that the Court had revealed a sensitivity to
the possibility that particular industries might recreate the forms of
American slavery under a different name.  As early as the Slaughter-House
Cases219—one of the first expositions of the Thirteenth Amendment’s
substantive content—the Court made it clear that this possibility loomed
large in its analysis.  There, the Court explained the Amendment’s prohi-
bition of “involuntary servitude” in the following terms:
It was very well understood that in the form of apprenticeship
for long terms, as it had been practiced in the West India Is-
lands, on [the occasion of] the abolition of slavery by the En-
glish government, or by reducing the slaves to the condition of
215. Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18.
216. Jefferson, supra note 116, at 403. R
217. VanderVelde, supra note 38, at 470–73 & n.150; supra text accompanying notes R
136–138. R
218. Professor Goluboff finds similar transformative significance in Pollock, albeit with
a more domestic focus.  As she explains, federal enforcement authorities (under the
leadership of Attorney General Biddle) viewed Pollock as a long overdue endorsement of a
broader, more liberatory enforcement of workers’ rights in America:  “In light of [the
above quoted statements], Biddle interpreted Pollock and the other 1940s peonage cases as
including within the mid-twentieth century meaning of involuntary servitude the creation
of a national, unitary labor market unimpeded by state and local legal obstacles.”
Goluboff, supra note 21, at 1675; see also id. at 1660 (“The ‘realities’ of involuntary R
servitude, which the turn-of-the-century Supreme Court had been unwilling to
acknowledge in its attention to contract, began to constitute its meaning and popular
usage in the 1940s.”); id. at 1656 (“Biddle . . . indicated that prohibiting involuntary
servitude meant far more than eliminating the direct coercion of a particular employer
upon a particular employee.  It meant the creation and protection of a unitary, national
labor market.”).
219. 82 U.S. 36 (1872).
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serfs attached to the plantation, the purpose of the article might
have been evaded, if only the word slavery had been used.220
The Court’s references to the West Indies and plantation farming in this
explanation are more than incidental.  The inclusion of “involuntary ser-
vitude” in the Amendment, the Court explains, was meant to reach those
arrangements (like peonage) that exhibited “that control by which the
personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another’s bene-
fit”221 but lacked other characteristics (property rights, corruption of
blood) that marked the American system of slavery.  Plantation farming,
the Amendment’s drafters understood, possessed a tenacious capacity to
create markets for the exploitation of involuntary labor, even following
the eradication of chattel slavery, and they included involuntary servitude
in the Amendment’s language in anticipation of such industry driven
efforts.
America’s experience in the years following emancipation—an expe-
rience characterized by the country’s failure in many respects to imple-
ment the principles that it had inscribed into the Constitution—served to
reinforce this lesson.  The country emerged from the Civil War with an
economy that remained largely dependent upon the exploitation of sub-
jugated workers.222  While the fiat of the Thirteenth Amendment could
effect radical changes in the legal status of American laborers, it could
not do the same for the structure of the American economy.  This was
one of the signature dilemmas of Reconstruction:  the sudden disjunc-
ture between the labor needs of American industry as it then existed and
the acceptable methods of fulfilling those needs.223  Professor Gerald
Jaynes, in his important economic analysis of the post-War South, poses
the problem in the following terms:  “[I]rrespective of one’s philosophi-
cal orientation, any attempt to understand American Reconstruction
must face this central issue:  after the abolition of slavery, how was an
industrial order dedicated to commercial production of agricultural
products for a market system to be maintained?”224  In declining to pro-
vide most of the freed slaves with homesteads or any other form of repa-
rations, Congress compounded the problem, rendering profoundly vul-
220. Id. at 69.
221. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911).
222. The roots of this dependency ran deep.  Professor Genovese has described, as
one of slavery’s “many paradoxes,” that “the dominant rural slaveholders required some
industrial expansion to support their plantation economy and political power but could
not sustain economically or tolerate politically a general industrialization.”  Eugene D.
Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery 181 (3d ed. 1965)
223. As one commentator observed as late as 1936:  “Slavery was too integral a part of
the social life of the South and too vital to the interests of certain classes to be suddenly
eliminated by a mere constitutional amendment, although the amendment did make
necessary the finding of new ways of perpetuating the Negro’s enslavement.”  Goluboff,
supra note 21, at 1679–80 (quoting Slavery Seventy Years After, 53 Christian Century 1645 R
(1936)).
224. Gerald David Jaynes, Branches Without Roots:  Genesis of the Black Working
Class in the American South, 1862–1882, at 5 (1986).
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nerable the very population of workers who would be the object of
industrial attempts to recreate the economic realities of slavery.  In this
respect, as in others, principle bowed to the perceived self-interest of
powerful economic forces during Reconstruction.225  Contemporary
lawmakers were not unaware of the problem.  To cite one example
among many, Thaddeus Stevens, one of the leading radicals in the Re-
construction Congress, forcefully upbraided his peers for their failure to
couple emancipation with economic reform:
We have turned, or are about to turn, loose four million slaves
without a hut to shelter them or a cent in their pockets.  The
infernal laws of slavery have prevented them from acquiring an
education, understanding the commonest laws of contract, or of
managing the ordinary business of life.  This Congress is bound
to provide for them until they can take care of themselves.  If we
do not furnish them with homesteads, and hedge them around
with protective laws; if we leave them to the legislation of their
late masters, we had better have left them in bondage.226
Yet warnings like Stevens’s went unheeded, and Congress established an
anemic Freedmen’s Bureau and made no provisions for reparations.227
An exploitative sharecropping system and arrangements of outright pe-
onage arose as a matter of course.228
The Slaughter-House Cases and Pollock come to us against the back-
drop of this experience.  The two cases are, in some sense, the warp and
woof of the Court’s first translation of the Thirteenth Amendment into a
new industrial context:  the Slaughter-House Cases providing an early state-
ment of principles that went largely unrealized for many years; Pollock
finally applying those principles in a definitive manner to the new pat-
terns of forced labor that had emerged to replace the old.  Together, the
discussions of labor and industry contained in the two cases set forth
some of the essential vocabulary of the Thirteenth Amendment and its
attitude toward the incorporation of forced labor in American industry.
Such statements may be more atmospheric than analytical.  But atmo-
spherics are important in the interpretation of an amendment whose
broad mandate “absolute[ly] declar[es] that slavery or involuntary servi-
tude shall not exist in any part of the United States.”229  One pervasive
element of the atmosphere that surrounds the constitutional prohibition
225. See id. at 16–53.
226. Id. at 19 (quoting Thaddeus Stevens, “Reconstruction,” December 18, 1865, in
Congress, in 2 Selected Papers of Thaddeus Stevens 44, 52 (Beverly Wilson Palmer ed.,
1998)).
227. As Professor Foner has explained, the Freedmen’s Bureau suffered from a
serious lack of funding, an overambitious mandate, and a misguided belief that the
economic interests of freed slaves and former slaveholders could be brought into harmony.
Eric Foner, Reconstruction:  America’s Unfinished Revolution 1863–1877, at 142–44,
169–70 (1988).
228. See Jaynes, supra note 224, at 24–53 (discussing conditions that gave rise to R
sharecropping); Jones, supra note 32, at 73–166 (discussing peonage arrangements). R
229. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
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against slavery is an acknowledgment that particular industries can read-
ily lend themselves to the exploitation of slavery and, in some cases, inten-
tionally create new markets for forced labor.  Indeed, in the case of Pol-
lock, that acknowledgment came at a time when concerns over the
exploitation of forced labor by foreign totalitarian regimes were acute.230
Coupled with that acknowledgment was a heightened attention to those
industrial arrangements that resurrect elements of the old American slave
system and attempt to reestablish them in a new industrial context.
B. Toward a Modern Jurisprudence of Slavery
1. Doctrinal Tools. — What, then, is accomplished in establishing
these three propositions?  Most importantly, they call upon us to remem-
ber that “slavery,” as that term is used in the Thirteenth Amendment,
does not simply describe the physical presence of individuals being
forced to labor against their will.  When the Amendment pronounces
that “slavery . . . shall [not] exist within the United States,” that pro-
nouncement necessarily operates on many levels.  It is founded first on
the understanding that slavery creates a pernicious interpersonal rela-
tionship that is injurious to owner and slave alike, working a “corruption
of manners in the master, from the entire subjection of the slaves he
possesses to his sole will.”231  In abolishing slavery, the Amendment neces-
sarily abolished the entire social relation of master and slave, for the do-
minion that an overseer exercises over a forced laborer is an evil that
attaches to both individuals.  Under the Thirteenth Amendment, neither
slaves nor masters may exist on domestic soil.
The Amendment’s mandate is also informed by a history of practical
experience with the supporting institutions of slavery—those that permit-
ted domestic slavery to function and those that were targeted for prosecu-
Professor VanderVelde has made a similar observation in discussing the ratification
debates for the Thirteenth Amendment:
The debates do not fix a single, static meaning for the amendment or the
concept of free labor.  Instead, they establish parameters within which many
interpretations are possible.  The resulting boundaries of meaning fence out
certain relationships as beyond the scope of the amendment.  They encompass a
vast array of possible interpretations emanating from the statements of the
framers’ core values and objectives.  And finally, the debates mark certain
customs and actions as evils to be proscribed.
VanderVelde, supra note 38, at 452. R
230. See Goluboff, supra note 21, at 1621 (“‘[T]he revival of slavery on a large scale R
by the totalitarian regimes in the new form of slave labor camps for ethnic and political
“unregenerates” has shaken [the] comfortable thought’ that ‘slavery and involuntary
servitude [were] evils which were wiped out in the Nineteenth Century.’” (quoting
Howard Devon Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History of the Thirteenth
Amendment:  What Is Not Involuntary Servitude, 10 Nat’l B.J., March 1952, at 7, 77)); cf.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1943) (articulating
American free speech principles in contradistinction to “our present totalitarian
enemies”).
231. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 500 (K.B. 1772).
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tion as a component of the forbidden slave trade.  That experience with
slavery’s supporting institutions in turn contributes an element to the
change that the Amendment has effected in the nature of the social and
economic relationships that can exist within the United States.  As in the
Slave Trade Cases before it, the Amendment raises a presumption against
those domestic commercial ventures that participate intimately in the de-
liberate exploitation of foreign slaves.  It requires, to quote one of the
Court’s 1864 opinions, that when a U.S. multinational corporation “en-
gages in a commerce, which, although not unlawful, is necessarily suspi-
cious from its theatre and circumstances, that [it] keep [its] operations so
clear and so distinct in their character, as to repel the imputation of pro-
hibited purpose.”232
And the Amendment carries with it a high degree of sensitivity to the
capacity of particular industries, through the incorporation of slave labor
into their operations, to create a self-justifying and self-perpetuating mar-
ket for human bondage.  Thus, when an industry lends itself to the ex-
ploitation of indigenous populations for reasons of geography or climate,
or when the economies of production in a poor or remote community
create powerful incentives to enslave workers in a local population—as in
the peonage arrangements of the Maine timber industry discussed in Pol-
lock233—these circumstances are not merely incidental to a Thirteenth
Amendment analysis.  Rather, they implicate one of the Amendment’s
central concerns.  Any analysis of forced labor in a new industrial context
must afford a privileged place to that concern, as the Court did in prohib-
iting the emerging peonage schemes of the early twentieth century.
These are not mere statements of abstract principle.  They are doctri-
nal tools—the same tools that pre-Civil War courts in free jurisdictions
employed in combating the domestic institution of slavery while it was
still alive, and that the post-Civil War Supreme Court employed in con-
cluding that putatively “voluntary” peonage schemes could not survive
Thirteenth Amendment scrutiny.  These same doctrinal tools likewise
govern claims of the exploitation of foreign labor by U.S. entities in mul-
tinational transactions.  By way of example, let us return to three of the
instances of forced labor described in Part I:  Burma, Saipan, and Ivory
Coast.
The strongest case for a foreign slave labor claim would seem to arise
where a U.S. entity deliberately subjects foreign workers to a condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude through direct participation.  The situa-
tion in Burma may fit this description.  Assuming, for present purposes,
that the facts alleged by the plaintiffs in Unocal are true, Unocal has en-
gaged in activities that implicate all three of the principles described
above.  First, it entered into a commercial venture with full knowledge
that indigenous laborers would be pressed into involuntary service on an
232. The Slavers (Kate), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 350, 364 (1864).
233. See supra notes 210–212 and accompanying text. R
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ongoing basis.234  These conditions of forced labor are episodic in na-
ture—the indigenous population has been subjugated as a direct re-
sponse to the industrial needs of the Unocal joint venture and the project
that they have undertaken.  The Yadana and Yetagun projects have thus
assumed the role of the Maine lumber industry and Southern plantation
farms before them, creating an inexorable demand for local, forced la-
bor.  In this light, Dick Cheney’s assertion for Halliburton—“The prob-
lem is that the good Lord didn’t see fit to always put oil and gas resources
where there are democratic governments”235—is revealed as a modern
analogue to the ubiquitous pre-Civil War rationalizations claiming that
domestic slavery was necessitated by exigencies of geography, economics,
or essential characteristics of race.236
It is further alleged that Unocal has itself participated in the ex-
ploitation of these indigenous laborers, instructing its agents and employ-
ees in how to dispose of their forced efforts.  It has given directions as to
where the laborers should clear land to lay pipe, where and when they
should build helicopter pads, and when they are needed as porters for
executive bodyguards.237  In so doing, Unocal has initiated a social rela-
tion of dominance between itself (through its agents and employees) and
the indigenous Burmese workers—a relation characterized further by
that particular quality of disposability that Professor Bales has identified
as characteristic of many modern slave relationships238 and that tainted
the American system of peonage.  Under Bailey v. Alabama, American in-
dustry is not “free” when it exhibits “that control by which the personal
service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit which
is the essence of involuntary servitude.”239
Finally, through its participation in these foreign labor practices,
Unocal has transformed a part of its U.S. operations into a supporting
institution for forced labor.  The U.S. company is providing the resources
and, in some cases, the personnel and instrumentalities for the enslave-
ment of the foreign workers—from food and provisions for the laborers
and their military overseers to shelter and transportation along the pipe-
line route.  This transformation recalls the role of the U.S. provisioners in
the Slave Trade Cases, facilitating the kidnapping and enslavement of for-
eign workers by providing the instrumentalities for their exploitation.240
That participation, though indirect, prompted the Supreme Court to re-
quire that U.S. businesses that “engage[ ] in a commerce, which, al-
though not unlawful, is necessarily suspicious from its theatre and cir-
234. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 884–85 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
235. Waldman, supra note 69.  See supra text accompanying notes 68–70. R
236. See supra Part II.A.3.
237. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 885; Total Denial Continues, supra note 57, at 62–99. R
238. Bales, supra note 52, at 4; see also Total Denial Continues, supra note 57, at R
23–25 (describing rotation of Burmese villagers through forced labor camps).
239. 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911).
240. See supra Part II.A.2.
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cumstances, . . . keep [their] operation[ ] so clear and so distinct in their
character, as to repel the imputation of prohibited purpose.”241
If the allegations against it are true, then Unocal’s participation in
the Burma project makes out a strong case for a Thirteenth Amendment
violation.  One can naturally expect the knowledge and complicity of U.S.
businesses in the use of foreign slave labor to be contested in such
cases.242  In this regard, however, it bears remembering that the Supreme
Court expressed contempt for the protestations of the industrial petition-
ers in the Slave Trade Cases that they were ignorant of the true nature of
the business they were supporting and so lacked direct responsibility.243
Similar arguments apply to sweatshop cases like the one in Saipan.  If
the allegations in those cases are true, then, as in Burma, the agents of
U.S. clothing manufacturers in Saipan have initiated a relationship of
dominance at the direction of the U.S. entities, subjecting their workers
(many of whom were imported from poor Asian countries) to conditions
of forced labor on threat of violence or legal sanction.244  The U.S. enti-
ties, in setting up the sweatshops and hiring the personnel that would be
used to enslave the migrant workers, have transformed a portion of their
U.S. operations into supporting institutions for that slave system.  And, in
so doing, these U.S. entities have created markets for involuntary labor
that had not previously existed, resulting in many workers being lured
from their home countries under false pretenses and pressed into service
upon reaching Saipan.  When such conditions arise outside of American
territorial possessions (as experience suggests that they will), it appears
that sweatshop cases including allegations of this level of U.S. participa-
tion will also make out a strong Thirteenth Amendment claim.
The Thirteenth Amendment argument is weaker where the burden
of the claim is that a U.S. entity is knowingly making use of the fruits of a
slave system that it had no role in creating.  The recent experience with
cocoa plantations in Ivory Coast provides a good example.  Thus far,
there are no allegations that U.S. entities have played any role in initiat-
ing or directing the exploitation of slave labor on the plantations.  That
being so, the social relation of dominance appears to be absent—U.S.
entities and their agents play no direct role in the disposition of the invol-
untary laborers.  Moreover, the only tool or instrumentality of the foreign
slave system that U.S. entities appear to be supplying in such a case is the
241. The Slavers (Kate), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 350, 364 (1864).
242. Unocal recently won summary judgment on the Alien Tort Claims Act claims,
successfully arguing that the Burmese plaintiffs had not adduced sufficient evidence to
raise a triable issue on Unocal’s intentional exploitation of local workers.  Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 2000).  At the writing of this Article, that
ruling is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
243. See, e.g., The Slavers (Kate), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) at 366 (“The case presents none of
the marks of an honest transaction, but bears upon it such indications of the guilty
purpose to employ the bark in the slave-trade, that we should require clear explanation by
convincing proof to repel the conclusion that such was her destined employment.”).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 76–79. R
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money that they pay for the goods produced by forced labor.  While it is
undoubtedly the case that such money ultimately contributes to the sub-
jugation of more forced laborers, this is an attenuated connection.  The
strongest argument in the cocoa bean case would seem to arise if it could
be shown that U.S. entities constituted most or all of the market for the
product of the foreign slave labor—if, in other words, it could legiti-
mately be said that U.S. entities were creating the market for slave labor
through their purchase of these foreign goods.  This probably is not so in
the case of cocoa beans—the U.S. is not the only consumer of Ivory
Coast’s production.245
And even if U.S. entities, through their purchase of a particular
good, were solely responsible for the creation of a foreign market in slave
labor, this would seem, without more, to be a weak case.  Recognizing a
Thirteenth Amendment claim in such a case would essentially amount to
the imposition of a general embargo upon exclusive trading arrange-
ments with nations that exhibit serious problems with forced labor.
There seems little basis for interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment so
totally to preempt the traditional authority of Congress and the President
to conduct America’s foreign trade policy.246  While there might be a
moral imperative for U.S. chocolate producers to avoid supporting the
exploitation of forced labor through their purchases of raw materials, the
Thirteenth Amendment probably does not mandate this result.
2. Substantive Objections. — One can imagine a number of substantive
objections to these types of Thirteenth Amendment claims.  First, the fac-
tual issues in a foreign slave labor case will often be quite complex, owing
in no small part to the involvement of foreign jurisdictions.  Logistically,
the sources of evidence in such a case are likely to span continents, being
located both in the domestic offices of U.S. entities and in the jurisdic-
tion where their employees or agents, and the forced laborers, are physi-
cally located.
But the added complexity that might attend some foreign slave labor
cases does not call into question the propriety of recognizing the claims.
U.S. antitrust laws have been applied to international disputes for de-
cades now, often in cases of great complexity that require a court to assess
market conditions in one or more foreign jurisdictions, and courts have
learned to address these claims.247  More broadly, the complexities at-
tendant to a foreign slavery case are liable to be present in any case seek-
ing to enforce international human rights principles.  Since the Second
245. See America’s Sweets, supra note 86, at 1–2. R
246. Cf. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–86 (2000)
(discussing presumptive role of Congress and President in conducting foreign relations).
247. See, e.g., In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 468–72 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(detailing antitrust claims involving international insurance interests), rev’d, 938 F.2d 919
(9th Cir. 1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764 (1993).
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Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,248 claimants have increasingly
used the Alien Tort Claims Act249 to raise claims alleging violations of
international law against both foreign and domestic entities (including
Unocal) in U.S. courts.250  In short, the objection that such cases are too
complex or difficult to adjudicate in American courts is one that we have
already moved past in the spheres of both commerce and human rights.
A more serious objection might arise in cases where the foreign slave
labor follows a putative criminal conviction.  The Thirteenth Amendment
makes an explicit exception in its mandate for those whose labor is “a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed.”251  That exception would presumptively apply with equal force to
a claim under the Thirteenth Amendment based upon foreign slave prac-
tices.  This might raise difficult issues in cases where the criminal justice
system of another country employs standards that would not be accept-
able under our Constitution.  In China, for example, there is a wide-
spread practice of forced labor in “Laogai”—labor camps to which indi-
viduals are sent following prosecution for criminal offenses.252  If a U.S.
corporation began using labor in Laogai camps, a Thirteenth Amend-
ment claim seeking to enjoin the practice would meet with the objection
that the workers had been “duly convicted” of a crime and hence were
outside the Amendment’s reach.  China’s standards of due process and
the rights of criminal defendants fall far short of our own.253  In the civil
context, there are provisions in American conflicts law for a U.S. court to
248. 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that Alien Tort Claims Act provides
cause of action under which foreign nationals can enforce violations of international law).
See also Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing:  International Human
Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 463, 464–66, 480–93 (1997)
(discussing foundations for Filartiga decision).
249. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
250. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing
genocidal campaign of organized violence as basis for ATCA claim in case arising from
Bosnian conflict); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 446, 490–91 (D.N.J.
1999) (recognizing, in principle, ATCA claims against Ford Motor Company concerning
role in Nazi war crimes, but dismissing on grounds of treaty foreclosure and statute of
limitations); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891–92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (recognizing
forced labor in Burma as basis for ATCA claim).
251. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.
252. U.S. Implementation of Prison Labor Agreements with China:  Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 48–51 (1997) (statement of Harry
Wu, Executive Director, Laogai Research Foundation) (describing use of forced labor in
Laogai camps to produce goods imported by American corporations); Melissa Pearson
Frugé, Comment, The Laogai and Violations of International Human Rights Law:  A
Mandate for the Laogai Charter, 38 Santa Clara L. Rev. 473, 473 (1998) (describing Laogai
prison camps as “principally a tool for communist political coercion, which operates by
means of forced, or slave, labor”).
253. See Amnesty International, People’s Republic of China:  Gross Human Rights
Violations Continue 10–11 (1996), available at http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.
nsf/index/ASA170171996ENGLISH/$File/ASA1701796.pdf (detailing unfair trial
practices in China, including no presumption of innocence, limited right to conduct
defense, and pervasive political pressure) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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assess the fairness of the proceedings that produced a foreign judgment
for which U.S. recognition is requested.254  But in the criminal context,
the act of state doctrine might prevent a U.S. court from questioning the
processes by which a foreign national has been prosecuted.255  This result
has obtained in a case involving deportation by Swiss authorities256 and
finds support in the Restatement of Foreign Relations.257  Even if it might be
thought to apply, however, the act of state doctrine does not enjoy consti-
tutional foundations.258  A forced laborer could still argue that the Thir-
teenth Amendment supersedes that doctrine and empowers a U.S. court
to assess the fundamental fairness of a criminal conviction offered as justi-
fication for his enslavement.259  These issues will merit further attention
as the doctrine of multinational slave labor evolves.
254. Unif. Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act § 4, 13 U.L.A. 268 (1986)
(foreign money judgment is not enforceable if tribunal was not impartial or procedures
otherwise did not comport with minimal due process requirements); Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98 (1971) (“A valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation
after a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States so far as
the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned.” (emphasis
added)); cf. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467–70, 481–83 (1982)
(applying similar standard for according full faith and credit to U.S. judgments).  See
generally Courtland H. Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second Restatement
of Conflict of Laws, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 220 (1972) (evaluating the Second Restatement’s
approach to foreign judgments).
255. The “classic American statement of the act of state doctrine,” according to the
Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, provides:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another done within its own territory.  Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of
by sovereign powers as between themselves.
376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964) (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
256. In Galu v. Swissair:  Swiss Air Transp. Co., 873 F.2d 650, 654–55 (2d Cir. 1989),
the Second Circuit disallowed a claim by a plaintiff seeking compensation from Swiss Air
for its cooperation with Swiss police in forcibly deporting her.  The Court explained:
The issue is whether the action taken against [the plaintiff] in removing her to
the United States was an action that had been ordered in the exercise of the
sovereign authority of Switzerland, or whether it was simply an ad hoc decision of
local police officers.  The burden is on the defendant to establish foreign law to
the extent necessary to demonstrate its entitlement to the act of state defense.
Evidence of foreign law is required not to determine whether the forcible
removal . . . was lawful but whether it was in fact an act of state.
 Id. at 654.
257. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 443, cmt. i (1987) [hereinafter Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations] (stating that
act of state doctrine applies to conduct plainly authorized or required by foreign law).
258. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427 (“[T]he act of state doctrine is a principle of decision
binding on federal and state courts alike but compelled by neither international law nor
the Constitution . . . .”).
259. Cf. Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States:  Liberal Internationalism and
the Act of State Doctrine, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1907, 1910–12 (1992) (arguing that act of
state doctrine does, and should, operate differently depending upon the identity of the
country involved).
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III. JURISDICTION AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN GLOBAL SLAVERY DISPUTES
Thus far, I have not discussed the Thirteenth Amendment’s applica-
tion to the foreign slave practices of U.S. corporations as an “extraterrito-
rial” doctrine.  The choice has been deliberate.  At the beginning of this
Article, I framed the discussion to follow with the proposition that the
knowing use of slave labor by U.S.-based entities in their foreign opera-
tions constitutes the presence of “slavery” within the United States, as that
term is used in the Thirteenth Amendment.  The practice of slavery, in
other words, is impermissibly present in the territorial and political com-
munity of the United States whenever a U.S. citizen intentionally partici-
pates in that practice or devotes U.S. industry to facilitating it.  Slavery, I
contend, is distinctive in this respect.  The judicial treatment that slavery
and forced labor have received is qualitatively different from that re-
ceived by other private activities—like discrimination, or anticompetitive
activity—that are subject to the prohibitory authority of American law.260
Indeed, one of the questions that the foregoing analysis raises is whether
this distinctive judicial treatment of slavery is purely a legal response to
historical fact—the Thirteenth Amendment is special simply because the
history of slavery in America was special—or whether the judicial cogni-
zance that American courts have taken of slavery’s interpersonal, institu-
tional, and industrial features reflects deeper, transcontextual facts about
the ontology of forced labor.  This is an important question, and worthy
of further inquiry.
Moreover, there can be no doubt that American participation in the
trading of slaves abroad has been prohibited, first by statutes that pre-
ceded the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, and later by statutes
passed to enforce its proscription.261  Illicit U.S. participation in the for-
eign slave trade was one of the principal dramas of the American experi-
ence with slavery in the nineteenth century,262 and, I argue, it was one of
the evils at which the Thirteenth Amendment was aimed.  The issue re-
mained salient following the Civil War, as the trade in slaves continued in
Brazil and the West Indies for some years.263  In this respect, the Thir-
teenth Amendment and its implementing statutes have always had “extra-
territorial” application.  The doctrines explored above hardly trod upon
unexplored terrain.
All of that said, it is still appropriate to ask how the application of the
Thirteenth Amendment to the foreign slave practices of modern U.S. cor-
260. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259 (1991) (denying
extraterritorial effect to federal antidiscrimination law); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443–44 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.) (setting forth “effects test” for
application of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign activity).
261. 18 U.S.C. § 1582 (1994) (prohibiting participation of U.S. citizens in foreign
slave trade); id. § 1585 (prohibiting sale of slaves in foreign slave trade); see also supra text
accompanying notes 164–168 (discussing pre-Amendment statutory prohibition). R
262. See supra Part II.A.2.
263. Thomas, supra note 162, at 769–90. R
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porations fares under the established doctrines for determining the ex-
traterritorial effect of U.S. laws.  The short answer is, quite well—the ap-
plication of the Thirteenth Amendment explored above is not only
allowable under, but indicated by, established extraterritoriality doc-
trines.  But the path to that conclusion requires a number of turns, for
the Thirteenth Amendment poses some distinctive interpretive chal-
lenges to accepted extraterritoriality doctrines.
A. Extraterritoriality and the Thirteenth Amendment
As an initial matter, it is clear that the application of the Thirteenth
Amendment to the foreign slave practices of U.S. entities is a permissible
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction.  The doctrine of national jurisdiction
permits a sovereign to apply its laws to the activities of its own citizens and
residents, wherever undertaken.264  While the Restatement of Foreign Rela-
tions characterizes national jurisdiction as an “exceptional” doctrine,265 it
is a widely accepted alternative to territoriality and has been repeatedly
recognized both in the U.S. and abroad.266  (This basis of prescriptive
jurisdiction, as all others, is generally understood to operate subject to a
“reasonableness” requirement, an issue to which I will return pres-
ently.)267  The more pertinent question is whether it is appropriate,
under traditional doctrines of extraterritoriality, to authorize such an ap-
plication of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Broadly speaking, cases addressing the extraterritorial reach of U.S.
constitutional provisions are concerned with restraining the activities that
U.S. authorities undertake abroad.268  This concern is a natural conse-
264. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 899–903 (D.D.C. 1988)
(describing bases for prescriptive jurisdiction).
265. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, supra note 257, § 402 cmt. b R
(“Territoriality is considered the normal, and nationality an exceptional, basis for the
exercise of jurisdiction.”).
266. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436–38 (1932) (upholding
service of subpoena on U.S. citizen in France based on nationality).  Professor Neuman
explains that the expansion of nationality as a basis for prescriptive jurisdiction paralleled
the United States’ rise as a superpower following World War I.  Neuman, supra note 23, at R
965.
267. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, supra note 257, § 403(1) (“Even when R
one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may not exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with
another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.”); id. § 403(2) (listing
factors to consider in determining reasonableness).
268. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990)
(denying extraterritorial effect to Fourth Amendment where agents of U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency, working in tandem with local Mexican officials, searched without
warrant homes of Mexican citizens suspected of dealing drugs); Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763, 784–85 (1950) (denying extraterritorial effect to Fifth Amendment where
U.S. officials imprisoned foreign “enemy aliens” in Germany following World War II);
United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (extending Fifth
Amendment protections against self incrimination to foreign national interrogated by U.S.
officials in conjunction with local law enforcement in Kenya).
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quence of the substantive scope of most constitutional provisions.  Be-
cause they contain a state action requirement, the question of their extra-
territorial effect usually arises only where the State has acted abroad,
through its agents. Because constitutional provisions are generally pro-
hibitory in nature, these questions usually involve attempts by petitioners
to restrain the actions of the State.269  This focus stands in contrast to
cases addressing the extraterritorial reach of federal statutes.270  Once
again, this is a natural consequence of the substantive scope of most stat-
utes, which often make no reference to state action and are principally
directed at regulating the conduct of business in the private sector.
The Thirteenth Amendment embodies a singular exception to this
neatly divided framework.  Because it contains no state action require-
ment, the Amendment both restrains the actions of the State and regu-
lates the activities of private individuals, imposing, as I put it earlier, self-
executing, substantive limitations on private social and economic rela-
tionships.271  In other words, the Thirteenth Amendment exhibits both
the characteristics of a constitutional provision and, in some respects,
those of a statute.  Consequently, the Amendment implicates aspects of
both forms of extraterritoriality analysis:  that traditionally applied to con-
stitutional provisions and that usually reserved for legislative enactments.
1. Textual Arguments. — For a textual analysis of the Thirteenth
Amendment, it remains appropriate to look primarily to the line of cases
construing the extraterritorial reach of other constitutional amend-
ments.272  Where statutes are concerned, the Supreme Court has re-
quired that Congress “clearly express” an “affirmative intention” to ex-
tend the reach of its enactments beyond U.S. borders.273  This may be an
appropriate requirement for legislative enactments, in which Congress
frequently attempts to set forth a regulatory scheme that is comprehen-
sive in scope and can be amended or adjusted through subsequent legis-
lation as needed.  But it ill fits interpretation of the Constitution, no part
of which expresses such an intent, and which in any event is constrained
by different parameters.  Most provisions of the Constitution are written
in concise, broadly worded language embodying statements of principle
269. See Neuman, supra note 23, at 943. R
270. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945)
(Hand, J.) (holding that U.S. antitrust laws apply to foreign activity that intentionally
produces substantial effect in United States).
271. See supra Part I.A.
272. See authorities cited supra note 268. R
273. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Benz v.
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)).  Some commentators have
suggested that the Court’s subsequent decision in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764 (1993), may have relaxed this standard somewhat.  See, e.g., Larry Kramer,
Comment, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case:
A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 750, 750 (1995) (noting
how Hartford could affect future litigation; specifically discussing Aramco, supra, and the
role of comity).
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rather than exhaustive schemes of regulation, and, of course, their lan-
guage cannot be changed or updated without employing the full process
of amendment set forth in Article V.
Thus, the Court has looked to other textual indicators for guidance
as to the proper application of constitutional provisions in multinational
disputes.  It has placed significant weight upon the Framers’ choice of
terms in describing the intended recipients of a provision’s substantive
protection—particularly their use of “the people” in some parts of the
Constitution, and terms like “person” or “accused” in others.  The Court
has found in this textual variation an intention on the part of the Framers
to reserve some constitutional protections to members of a territorially
defined, national community.  This view is set forth most clearly in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, in which the Court denied the request of a Mex-
ican national to suppress evidence seized by DEA agents through warrant-
less searches undertaken in Mexico.274  Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained:
[The Fourth Amendment], by contrast with the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, extends its reach only to “the people.” . . . [This
phrase] seems to have been a term of art employed in select
parts of the Constitution.  The Preamble declares that the Con-
stitution is ordained and established by “the People of the
United States.”  The Second Amendment protects “the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms,” and the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments provide that certain rights and powers are re-
tained by and reserved to “the people.”  While this textual exe-
gesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that “the people” pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment . . . refers to a class of persons
who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be consid-
ered part of that community.  The language of these Amend-
ments contrasts with the words “person” and “accused” used in
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments regulating procedure in crimi-
nal cases.275
The Framers’ use of the more ecumenical “no person” construction
in some provisions, the Court has concluded, lends itself more readily to
application in cases involving claimants outside the political community
of the United States.276  Judge Leonard Sand recently relied upon these
textual arguments in his much noted ruling that U.S. law enforcement
agents who operate in foreign countries must satisfy the requirements of
274. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990).
275. Id. at 265–66 (citations omitted).
276. One may well question whether the Framers themselves would have placed any
such interpretation upon this choice of words, as Professor Neuman has argued.  See
Neuman, supra note 23, at 980 (“[T]he drafting of the Bill of Rights reflected inattention R
to the problematics of government activity abroad rather than a conscious effort to design
entitlements solely for application within the territory . . . .”).
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Miranda when they interrogate criminal suspects, regardless of the sus-
pects’ nationality.277
This line of argument lends strong support to the application of the
Thirteenth Amendment to the foreign slave practices of U.S. entities.
The Amendment proscribes, not merely the enslavement of persons, but
the practice of slavery in its entirety.  Had the drafters of the Amendment
wished to limit the scope of the Amendment to the enslavement of mem-
bers of the American political community, they could have provided that
“The right of the people to be free from slavery or involuntary servitude
shall not be violated.”278  Had they wished to limit the substantive scope
of the Amendment to prohibitions on physically enslaved individuals, the
drafters could have specified those individuals by providing that “No per-
son shall be subjected to slavery, nor to involuntary servitude”279—as, in-
deed, they did in drafting the Fourteenth Amendment.280  Instead, the
drafters chose distinctively capacious language, sweeping in the entire in-
stitution of slavery and all its components:  “Neither slavery nor involun-
tary servitude . . . shall exist . . . .”281  The drafters of the Amendment
sought to extirpate the practice of slavery from the United States, root
and branch, and they chose language that would reach all of its multiple
layers.
Another textual issue in the Thirteenth Amendment also deserves
attention.  The Amendment provides that slavery shall not exist “within
277. United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  Indeed,
Judge Sand offered the textual argument as the starting point of his analysis:
We turn first to the expansive language used in the Fifth Amendment itself.
Its criminal procedure provisions are that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
The crucial phrase is “no person” and it neither denotes nor connotes any
limitation in scope, in marked contrast to the use of “the people” in most of the
other Amendments contained within the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 183 (citations omitted).
278. I invite comparison here to the Fourth Amendment:  “The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.
279. And here, I invite comparison with the Fifth Amendment.  See supra note 277. R
280. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
281. Id. amend. XIII, § 1.  The same textual argument would presumably apply to the
protections conferred by both the Third and Eighth Amendments.  See id. amend. III
(“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the
Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”); id. amend. VIII
(“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”).
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the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”  Does this clause
bear on the interpretive question, either as a term of expansion or of
limitation?  The only construction that the Court has given these words,
in dictum, is equivocal on the point.  In Downes v. Bidwell—one of the
“notorious Insular Cases”282—the Court held that the Constitution’s uni-
form taxation requirement does not apply to the Commonwealth of Pu-
erto Rico because the Framers, in specifying that “all Duties, Imposts and
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States,”283 had intended the
provision to apply only to the states themselves and not to other U.S.
territories and possessions.284  The disposition of the Court resulted from
two opinions, neither one of which garnered a majority.  In the lead opin-
ion, Justice Brown, writing only for himself, read the language of the
Thirteenth Amendment expressly to include territories and other U.S.
possessions (like Puerto Rico) within its scope.  He invoked the Amend-
ment to draw a contrast with the language in the uniform taxation clause,
which refers only to “the United States”:
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, prohibit-
ing slavery and involuntary servitude “within the United States,
or in any place subject to their jurisdiction,” is also significant as
showing that there may be places within the jurisdiction of the
United States that are no part of the Union.  To say that the
phraseology of this amendment was due to the fact that it was
intended to prohibit slavery in the seceded States, under a possi-
ble interpretation that those States were no longer a part of the
Union, is to confess the very point in issue, since it involves an
admission that, if these States were not a part of the Union they
were still subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.285
Justice White, joined by two others, concurred in the result reached by
the lead opinion, though differing significantly in his approach to the
uniform taxation question.  On the significance of the Thirteenth
Amendment, however, White was in agreement:
In concluding my appreciation of the history of the government
attention is called to the Thirteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution, which to my mind seems to be conclusive.  The first sec-
tion of the amendment, the italics being mine, reads as follows:
“Sec. 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to their jurisdiction.”  Obviously this provision recognized that
there may be places subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States but which are not incorporated into it, and hence are not
282. Neuman, supra note 23, at 915, 958. R
283. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added).
284. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901).
285. Id. at 251 (plurality opinion).
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within the United States in the completest sense of those
words.286
Lastly, the four dissenters were of the view that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment would have applied to U.S. territories without the addition of that
phrase, and they concluded that it had merely been added “out of abun-
dant caution” and was entitled to “little weight.”287
I have reproduced these passages at length because they are the only
treatment that the Court has given to the Thirteenth Amendment’s refer-
ence to “jurisdiction,” but they seem to me to have little bearing on the
present question.  The slavery doctrine explored in this Article embraces
a clear territorial nexus—it is U.S. entities, exploiting slave labor in their
foreign operations, that the doctrine reaches.  It is an “extraterritorial”
doctrine in that it may be triggered by abuses occurring abroad, but it is
the participation of U.S. entities in the practice of slavery that offends the
Amendment’s substantive prohibition.  The dicta in Downes v. Bidwell sim-
ply make it clear that a corporation cannot shield its slave activities from
Thirteenth Amendment scrutiny by relocating to the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico; they do not purport to speak to the range of activities that
the Amendment reaches when undertaken by U.S. entities.  Thus, the
Amendment’s reference to “jurisdiction” neither confines it absolutely to
domestic territory in all its applications—a result already foreclosed by
the slave trade issue—nor expands the Amendment’s reach to the fullest
extent of prescriptive jurisdiction allowable.  Rather, it is cases like
Verdugo-Urquidez that provide the textual approach to addressing this
question.  Those cases indicate that the choice of language in the Thir-
teenth Amendment firmly supports the slavery doctrine explored above.
2. Multilateral Considerations. — When domestic law regulates the ac-
tivities of private actors operating outside its territorial borders, we must
ordinarily ask whether such regulation runs afoul of limitations embod-
ied in private international law or principles of comity.  In some respects,
those inquiries do not fit neatly into an examination of a constitutional
provision.  Rules of international law enter American disputes as federal
common law.288  When federal statutes are analyzed in light of interna-
tional law principles, the relevant inquiry is whether the general pre-
sumption that Congress legislates consistently with these common law
principles is overcome in a particular case.289  While one could, in theory,
286. Id. at 336–37 (White, J., concurring).
287. Id. at 358 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
288. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, supra note 257, at § 111 R
cmt. d (noting that international law enters as federal common law); Lea Brilmayer,
Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 295, 295, 302–04 (1994) (discussing post-Erie consensus that international law enters
America as federal common law).  But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law:  A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 816–21 (1997) (challenging received view that
international law enters American legal system as federal common law).
289. Chief Justice Marshall’s early statement of the doctrine remains canonical:
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ask the same type of question about the scope of a constitutional provi-
sion, the Constitution does not generally bow to inconsistent common
law principles.  Even so, it may be useful to ask whether a proposed appli-
cation of a constitutional provision is consistent with such principles.
Broadly speaking, once a domestic court has determined that its laws
were intended to have extraterritorial effect, international limitations call
upon the court to address two sets of concerns:  the private interests of
the regulated parties, and the potentially competing public policies of
sovereign entities and the international community.  The private interests
of regulated parties primarily entail the existence of justified party expec-
tations.290  Thus, for example, if the legitimate business planning efforts
of a corporation would be frustrated by legal regulations that the com-
pany could not reasonably have anticipated would apply, this might mili-
tate against extraterritoriality.291  The potentially competing public poli-
cies of sovereigns come into play when extraterritoriality might subject a
private entity to inconsistent or conflicting legal regulations.292  In a typi-
cal case, a sovereign might find that its regulatory policies have been ef-
fectively displaced by the threat that another sovereign will give extraterri-
torial effect to its own, stricter set of standards, causing a “race to the top”
as companies seek to avoid liability.  Once again, this is a signature issue
in antitrust, where the broad application of comparatively restrictive
American laws to multinational corporations threatens to displace local
business regulations in other markets.293  In rare cases, multinational ac-
tors might actually find themselves subject to irresolvable conflicts, in
which the laws of one state command them to take actions that are for-
bidden by the laws of another.  In this narrow range of cases, the Su-
preme Court has suggested that principles of comity might call for an
[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains, and consequently can never be
construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is
warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country.
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.).
290. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, supra note 257, § 403(2)(d) R
(looking to “the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation”).
291. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 611–13
(9th Cir. 1977) (describing range of interests to consider in defining extraterritorial scope
of federal antitrust statute).
292. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, supra note 257, § 403(2)(g) R
(looking to “the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity”); id. § 403(2)(h) (looking to “the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another
state”).
293. See, e.g., Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a
(1994) (limiting application of antitrust laws to conduct that “has a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic or export commerce); Den Norske Stats
Oljeselskap AS v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 428–29 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that FTAIA
is intended to exempt “purely foreign transactions” from U.S. antitrust laws).
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extraterritorial application of U.S. law to bow to foreign policies.294
While approaches to the question vary considerably,295 most courts and
commentators agree that extraterritorial analysis should proceed with
these multilateral policy concerns in mind.296
Both the private and the public interests associated with avoiding po-
tential conflicts with competing sources of foreign law are considerably
reduced in the slavery doctrine explored in this Article.  The prohibition
of slavery has been recognized as a peremptory norm of international
law.297  The basic policy prohibiting the exploitation of slave labor is thus
universally applicable, governing both states and private actors, and local
municipal laws in conflict with that policy are presumptively invalid.  In
effect, when a nation gives extraterritorial effect to a provision like the
Thirteenth Amendment, it is providing an enforcement mechanism for a
principle of international law that already underlies all multinational
transactions.  That being so, the danger of a conflict with legitimate pri-
vate or sovereign interests is greatly reduced.  Indeed, as Professor Joel
Paul has explained, the doctrine of comity arose in large part as a re-
sponse to legalized slavery, as a means of permitting free jurisdictions to
resist the intrusion of slavery into their territory.298  It would constitute a
significant reversal to apply the doctrine in a fashion that would facilitate
such an intrusion.  One can imagine conflicts in the particular schemes
chosen by different sovereigns to enforce the abolitionist norm.  If such
conflicts arise, they may warrant further examination.  But a nation’s pol-
icy seeking to tolerate or promote local slave practices would receive no
solicitude in multinational disputes, whether considered under interna-
tional law or principles of comity.
294. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993) (holding by
implication that deference to foreign law under comity principles may be appropriate
“where a person subject to regulation by two states [cannot] comply with the laws of both”
(quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, supra note 257, § 403 cmt. e)). R
295. Compare id. at 794–99 (looking to direct and substantial domestic effects), and
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443–45 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.)
(same), with Timberlane Lumber, 549 F.2d at 613–15 (looking to totality of factors and
interests of competing sovereigns).
296. Most, but not all.  Professor Dodge, for example, has argued that courts should
determine the extraterritorial effect of domestic laws without reference to any such
concerns:  “I argue that a court should apply a statute extraterritorially whenever doing so
appears to advance the purposes of the statute and should not worry about resolving
conflicts of jurisdiction with other nations.”  William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and
Conflict-of-Laws Theory:  An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 Harv. Int’l L.J. 101,
104–05 (1998).
297. See supra note 31. R
298. Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1, 12 (1991)
(“[Lord] Mansfield and especially [Justice] Story saw comity as a principle that allowed
free and slave states to coexist without requiring the courts of free states to apply the laws
of slavery.”)
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B. Early Evidence?
There is one tantalizing piece of early evidence concerning the im-
pact that the drafters intended the Thirteenth Amendment to have upon
the foreign slave practices of U.S. citizens.  In 1871, six years after the
ratification of the Amendment, Congressman Nathaniel Banks of Massa-
chusetts introduced a bill into the House of Representatives.299  It was
entitled “A bill to carry into effect article thirteen of [the amendments
to] the Constitution of the United States, and to prohibit the owning or
dealing in slaves by American citizens in foreign countries.”300  Like most
other statutes passed under the Thirteenth Amendment’s enforcement
clause (before and since), it was a criminal statute.301  Banks presented
the bill to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, where it was read twice,
ordered to be printed,302 and then, apparently, died in committee.  The
New York Times contemporaneously noted its introduction, without fur-
ther discussion, as one entry on a list detailing recent legislative activ-
ity.303  The proposed bill reads, in its entirety, as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That if any citizen of
the United States shall own or be directly or indirectly, as lessor
or lessee, as mortgagor or mortgagee, as assignor or assignee, or
otherwise, interested in slaves, or in persons held in involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, he shall be deemed guilty of a
high misdemeanor, and shall be liable to be prosecuted therefor
before any circuit or district court of the United States, and be-
ing convicted thereof shall be fined not exceeding _______
thousand dollars, and be imprisoned for not less than _______
nor more than _______ years.
Sec. 2.  That no citizen of the United States who shall own,
or be directly or indirectly, as lessor or lessee, as mortgagor or
mortgagee, as assignor or assignee, or otherwise, interested in
slaves, or in persons held in involuntary servitude, except as
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall receive, or be entitled to receive, any protection
whatever from the Government of the United States, or from
299. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1871).
300. H.R. 490, 42d Cong. (1871).
301. See supra note 30.  The Federal Anti-Peonage Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1994), is R
the exception.  As mentioned earlier, that statute abolishes all peonage schemes and was
aimed at the state-sanctioned practices discussed in Part I.  See supra notes 39–50 and R
accompanying text.
While it is possible that an individual could maintain a private right of action for
damages under § 1994, there does not appear to be a reported case in which an individual
has successfully done so.  Cf. Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24, 30 (9th Cir. 1969) (assuming
possibility of private right of action for peonage but dismissing for failure to state a claim);
Bryant v. Donnell, 239 F. Supp. 681, 684–85 (W.D. Tenn. 1965) (same).
302. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1871).
303. House of Representatives, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1871, at 5.
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any officer thereof, against, or on account of, any act or acts
committed against him, or against his property of any kind, with-
out and beyond the jurisdiction of the United States.
Sec. 3.  That before any alien shall be admitted to become a
citizen of the United States, he shall declare on oath or affirma-
tion before the supreme, superior, district, or circuit court of
some one of the States, or of the territorial districts of the
United States, or before any court of record in any individual
State having common-law jurisdiction and a seal and clerk or
prothonotary, or before a circuit or district court of the United
States, that he does not own and is not directly or indirectly, as
lessor or lessee, as mortgagor or mortgagee, as assignor or as-
signee, or otherwise, interested in slaves, or in persons held in
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime of
which the party shall have been duly convicted.304
In this bill may be seen much of the American experience with slav-
ery examined throughout this Article.  The bill proposes to carry into
effect the elimination of the entire social relation of slavery by criminaliz-
ing the status of “master,” irrespective of the physical location of the en-
slaved individual.  It recognizes the role of “indirect” offenders in sup-
porting the institution of slavery and imposes criminal sanctions of
sweeping breadth to catch them within its net, reaching anyone who is
“directly or indirectly . . . interested in slaves, or in persons held in invol-
untary servitude.”  And it provides a reminder of the worldwide industry
in slave labor that continued to thrive in Africa, Latin America, and parts
of Europe even following its official eradication in the United States—
and that continues to thrive today.305
The value of this proposed statute in determining the content of a
modern Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence is unavoidably ambigu-
ous.  A skeptic might argue that we should interpret the Committee on
Foreign Affairs’ failure to act on the bill as evidence that the bill ex-
ceeded the substantive scope intended for the Amendment, though there
appears to be no evidence to support that conclusion.  I take the bill as
further confirmation that the drafters of the Amendment, steeped in the
multilayered practice of slavery, understood that slavery could not be
eradicated from American society and industry without reaching all the
slave activities of U.S. citizens, both at home and abroad.  For me, the
failure of the bill to gain passage is best explained as a failure of political
will.  In the case of the foreign slave trade, criminal sanctions were al-
ready in place when the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified that prohib-
ited any form of American participation in the practice here or abroad,
and the country had already had over fifty years of official proscription
and ten years of active prohibition in which to become accustomed to
those sanctions.306  “Slave traders” had long since become the designated
304. H.R. 490, 42d Cong. (1871).
305. See supra Part I.B.
306. See supra Part II.A.2.
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bugbears of the unstable practice of American slavery.307  But even fol-
lowing the Civil War, significant economic interests in both the North
and the South continued to be intimately intertwined with slave labor
around the world, and recent slave owners, far from being prosecuted or
vilified, were being invited back as full participants in the national politi-
cal community.  Banks’s sweeping antislavery bill—subjecting a trans-
gressing U.S. citizen to criminal sanction and dramatically denying him
“any protection whatever from the Government of the United States . . .
[for] any act or acts committed against him, or against his property of any
kind, without and beyond the jurisdiction of the United States”—was too
much, too soon.  America may have been prepared to acknowledge that
the newly enacted Amendment forbade foreign slave practices in princi-
ple, but not to back that principle with the threat of criminal sanctions.
Thus, the bill stands as an artifact.  It is a point of articulation that
reveals, even if it does not alone embody, the vocabulary of principles
that characterize its time.  The bill aids therefore in discerning “the essen-
tial feature[s] of the slavery that the Thirteenth Amendment commands
us to disestablish.”308
CONCLUSION
Any attempt to articulate a modern Thirteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence that is both coherent and relevant to modern industrial conditions
must grapple with history.  The drafters of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments employed broad language, untethered to the historical moment in
which they wrote.  That very open-endedness demands clear statements
of principle to guide our interpretation, and the search for those princi-
ples must be informed by the full measure of America’s experience with
slavery.  The Court has traveled this road, if slowly and imperfectly, in the
development of its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.  One of the
great triumphs of Brown was its transformation of the American history of
state sanctioned racial oppression from a tool of subjugation, as it had
been in Plessy, into one of liberation.  Recent retrenchments in the
Court’s equality jurisprudence have dimmed the luster of this triumph,309
but they will not reverse it.
The time has come for the Thirteenth Amendment to travel a similar
path.  The experience of slavery in America was an institutionalized af-
307. See, e.g., Peter Kolchin, American Slavery 1619–1877, at 98 (1994) (“Although
the slave trade was extremely lucrative . . . it was never entirely respectable.”); George
Shepperson, Comment, in Stanley L. Engerman & Eugene D. Genovese, Race and Slavery
in the Western Hemisphere:  Quantitative Studies 99, 103 (1975) (describing low social
status of those involved in slave trade).
308. Binder, supra note 5, at 2068. R
309. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (holding that
federal government must satisfy strict scrutiny when enacting race conscious remedial
legislation); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498–506 (1989) (adopting
strict evidentiary standards for race conscious remedial legislation).
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front that was multiple in its modes of operation and unimaginable in the
harm that it caused.  We would commit an unworthy mistake if we were to
insist upon a fancied simplicity in construing the constitutional provision
that sought to end that institution and prevent it from reappearing.  The
Supreme Court avoided that mistake once in the peonage cases of the
early twentieth century.  Now that the tragedy of slavery is again playing
out with American participants, this time on an international stage, we
must demonstrate a similar courage and vision when called upon to trans-
late the principles embodied in the Amendment to the global industrial
context.
